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Abstract: This paper integrates in a unified and tractable framework some of the key 
insights of the field of international trade and economic growth. It examines a 
sequence of theoretical models that share a common description of technology and 
preferences but differ on their assumptions about trade frictions. By comparing the 
predictions of these models against each other, it is possible to identify a variety of 
channels through which trade affects the evolution of world income and its 
geographical distribution. By comparing the predictions of these models against the 
data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income differences and 
long-run trends in economic growth. 
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 1“All theory depends on assumptions that are not quite true. That is 
what makes it theory. The art of successful theorizing is to make the 
inevitable assumptions in such a way that the final results are not 
very sensitive. A “crucial” assumption is one on which the 
conclusions do depend sensitively, and it is important that crucial 
assumptions be reasonably realistic. When the results of a theory 
seem to flow specifically from a special crucial assumption, then if 
the assumption is dubious, the results are suspect.” 
 





The world economy has experienced positive growth for an extended period 
of time. Figure 1 plots average world per capita income from 1500 to today, using 
data from Maddison’s classic study of long run trends in the world economy. The 
most salient feature of the growth process is its nonlinear nature. For most of the 
past five hundred years, the world economy settled in a path of stagnation with little 
growth. But sometime around the early nineteenth century the world economy 
entered a path of sustained and even accelerating growth. While per capita income 
grew only by eighteen percent from 1500 to 1820, it has then grown by more than 
seven hundred and fifty percent from 1820 to today. And this growth has been far 
from steady. It averaged 0.53 percent from 1820 to 1870, and more than doubled to 
1.30 from 1870 to 1913. Growth declined to 0.91 percent during the turbulent period 
that goes from 1913 to 1950, and then exploded to an unprecedented 2.93 percent 
from 1950 to 1973. Since then growth has markedly declined to 1.33 percent, even 
though this period still constitutes the second best growth performance in known 
human history. 
 
This economic growth has not been distributed equally across the different 
regions of the world economy. Figure 2 shows per capita income growth for the 
different regions of the world economy in various time periods. Differences in 
 2regional growth experiences are quite remarkable.
1 Growth took off in Western 
Europe and its offshoots in the early nineteenth century and never stopped again. 
But other regions took longer to participate in the growth of the world economy. 
Perhaps the most dramatic case is that of Asia, which basically did not grow until 
1950 just to become then the fastest growing region in the world. Another extreme 
case is that of Africa, which still today is unable to enjoy growth rates that would be 
considered modest in other regions. Another salient feature of the growth process is 
therefore its uneven geographical distribution: in each period there are some regions 
that have been able to grow and prosper, while others have been left behind. 
 
  World economic growth has been accompanied by more than proportional 
growth in world trade. Figure 3 shows the evolution of world trade as a share of 
world production since 1870. The picture is quite clear: from 1870 to 1998 growth in 
world trade has quadrupled growth in world income. There also appears to be a 
strong positive correlation between growth in per capita income and growth in trade. 
Figure 4 plots the growth rates of these two variables against each other using 
pooled data from various regions and periods. The simple correlation between these 
variables is 0.64, and the regression results indicate that regions and periods with X 
percent higher than average trade growth tend to have per capita income growth 
which is 0.3⋅X higher than average. It almost goes without saying that this statistical 
association between income and trade does not imply causation in any direction. But 
it strongly suggests that these variables are somehow related, and that there might 
be substantial payoffs to working with theories that jointly determine them.
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1 To get a sense of the magnitudes involved, remember that an annual growth rate of G leads per 
capita income to multiply itself by a factor F≈exp{G⋅T} in T years. For instance, in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century Asia has been able to increase its per capita income by a factor of 2.5, while Latin 
America has only managed to increase its per capita income by a factor of 1.2 and Africa has 
stagnated. Even a cursory look at the data shows that this disparity in growth performances constitutes 
the norm rather than the exception. 
2 For empirical work on the (causal) effect of trade on income levels and income growth see Sachs and 
Warner [1995], Frankel and Romer [1999], Ades and Glaeser [1999], Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 
[2000 and their chapter in this handbook], Rodriguez and Rodrik [2000], Alcalá and Ciccone [2003 and 
2004], and Dollar and Kraay [2003]. 
 3Despite this apparent relationship between income and trade, a substantial 
part of growth theory is built on the assumption that countries live in autarky and that 
there is no trade among them.
3 This is obviously a dubious assumption. But is it also 
a “crucial” one? And if so, what alternative assumptions would be reasonably 
realistic? At an abstract level, these are the questions that I attempt to answer here. 
A recurring theme throughout this chapter is that the growth experiences of the 
different world regions are intimately linked and cannot be analyzed in isolation. We 
therefore need a global view of economic growth that looks at the different regions of 
the world as parts of a single whole. Formally, this means that we should develop 
and systematically study world equilibrium models. These models and their 
predictions constitute the specific focus of this chapter.
 4 
 
Rather than providing an all-encompassing survey of the field, my goal in 
writing this chapter has been to develop a unified and yet tractable framework to 
discuss key insights of the fields of international trade and economic growth. In 
particular, I examine a sequence of world equilibrium models that share a common 
description of technology and preferences but differ on their assumptions about 
trade frictions. By comparing the predictions of these models against each other, it is 
possible to identify a variety of channels through which trade affects the evolution of 
world income and its geographical distribution. By comparing their predictions 
against the data, it is also possible to construct coherent explanations of income 
differences and long run trends in economic growth. When viewed as a group, these 
models show that much is known about the relationship between income and trade. 
Despite this, I still feel we are only exploring the tip of the iceberg. The research 
program sketched here is ambitious, fun and it could eventually lead to a much 
deeper understanding of the forces that drive modern capitalist economies. 
                                                  
3 A brief examination of the different chapters of this handbook should quickly convince anyone 
doubting this statement. 
4 Without doubt, the seminal book by Grossman and Helpman [1991] is the single most influential 
contribution to the development and study of world equilibrium models of the growth process. It heavily 
influenced a whole generation of PhD students, like myself, that were searching for dissertation topics 
when the book first appeared. But there are, of course, many other important contributions. The 
bibliography at the end of this chapter is an (admittedly imperfect) attempt to list all published papers 
that use world equilibrium models to study the growth process. I apologize to the authors of any 
relevant paper that has been overlooked. 
 4 
The rest of this chapter contains four sections. The first one describes growth 
in the integrated economy. This is an imaginary world where trade costs are 
negligible and geography does not matter. Section two introduces two trade frictions: 
the immobility of production factors and the absence of international financial 
markets. Section three adds a third trade friction: costs of transporting goods. The 
fourth and final section briefly concludes by taking stock what we have learned and 
pointing out potential avenues for further research. 
 
 
1. The integrated economy 
 
Imagine a world without borders, a world in which all goods and factors can 
be transported across different regions at negligible cost. Some industries spread 
their production process across many regions searching for the ideal environment for 
each specific phase of production. Other industries choose instead to concentrate 
production in a single region to exploit increasing returns to scale. Regardless of an 
industry’s particular circumstances, its location choice maximizes productivity and is 
not affected by the local availability of production factors and/or final customers. If a 
region does not have the necessary production factors, these can be imported from 
abroad. If a region does not have enough customers, the goods produced can be 
exported abroad. In this world, global market forces arbitrage away regional 
differences in goods and factor prices and all the gains from trade are reaped. This 
imaginary world is the integrated economy, and is the subject of this section. 
 
The integrated economy provides a natural benchmark for the study of 
economic growth in an interdependent world. Moreover, its simplicity and elegance 
encapsulates the essence of what growth theory is all about: deriving strong results 
using minimalist models. In the spirit of the so-called “new growth theory”, I shall use 
a model that jointly determines the stock of capital and the level of technology. 
 5Admittedly, the model is somewhat lopsided. On the one hand, it contains a fairly 
sophisticated formulation of technology that includes various popular models as 
special cases. On the other hand, it uses a brutal simplification of the standard 
overlapping-generations model as a description of preferences. Despite this, I do not 
apologize for the imbalance. A robust theme in growth theory is that the interesting 
part of the story is nearly always on the technology side, and rarely on the side of 
preferences. 
 
  This section develops the basic framework that I use throughout the chapter. 
Sub-section 1.1 describes the integrated economy, while sub-section 1.2 derives its 
main predictions for world growth. Sub-section 1.3 goes back to a period in which all 
the regions of the world lived in autarky, and compares the growth process of this 
world with the integrated economy. This is just the first of various attacks to the 
question of globalization and its effects on the world economy. 
 
1.1 A workhorse model 
 
Consider a world economy inhabited by two overlapping generations: young 
and old. The young work and, if productive, they earn a wage. The old retire and live 
off their savings. All generations have size one. There are many final goods used for 
consumption and investment, indexed by i∈I. When this does not lead to confusion, I 
shall use I to refer both to the set of final goods and also to the number of final 
goods. As we shall see later, the production of these final goods requires a 
continuum of intermediate inputs. There are two factors of production: labor and 
capital. For simplicity, I assume capital depreciates fully within one generation.
5 The 
world economy contains many regions. But geography has no economic 
consequences since goods and factors can be transported from one region to 
another at any time at negligible cost. 
                                                  
5 The main role of this assumption is to ensure that investment is always strictly positive. This simplifies 
the presentation without substantially affecting the main results. 
 6 
The citizens of this world differ in their preferences and access to education. 
St members of the generation born in date t are patient and maximize the expected 
utility of old age consumption, while the rest are impatient and maximize the 
expected utility of consumption when young. The utility function has consumption as 
its single argument, and it is homothetic, strictly concave and identical for all 
individuals. Ht members of the generation born in date t can access education and 
become productive, while the rest have no access to education and remain 
unproductive.
6 I refer to St and Ht as “savings” and “human capital”, and I allow them 
to vary stochastically over time within the unit interval. Assuming that savings and 
human capital are uncorrelated within each generation, we obtain: 
 
(1)    t t t 1 t H w S K ⋅ ⋅ = +
(2)  t t t t t t K r H w ) S 1 ( C ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − =  
 
where Kt and Ct are the average or aggregate capital stock and consumption; and wt 
and rt are the wage and rental rate of capital. Equation (1) states that the capital 
stock equals the savings of the young, which consist of the wage of those that are 
patient and productive. The assumption that capital depreciates fully in one 
generation implies that the capital stock is equal to investment. Equation (2) says 
that consumption equals the wage of the impatient and productive young plus the 
return to the savings of the old.
7 
  
Consumption and investment can be thought of as composites or aggregates 
of the different final goods. A very convenient assumption is that both composites 
                                                  
6 The assumption that labor productivity is either one or zero is extreme, but inessential. We could also 
think of Ht as the average labor productivity of the world economy. The assumption that human capital 
is not industry specific is widespread, but not entirely innocent. See Basu and Weil [1998] and Brezis, 
Krugman and Tsiddon [1993] for interesting implications of relaxing this assumption. 
7 This representation of savings and consumption is nothing but a stripped-down version of Modigliani’s 
life-cycle theory of savings. It abstracts from other motives for savings such as leaving bequests. These 
could be easily re-introduced in the theory through suitable and well-known modifications of the 
preferences of individuals. I shall not do this to keep the analysis as simple as possible. I conjecture 
that the bulk of the basic intuitions and results presented here would not be meaningfully affected by 
these extensions. 
 7take the same Cobb-Douglas form with spending shares that vary across industries, 
i.e. σi with  1
i
i = σ ∑
∈I
. Since there is a common ideal price index for consumption and 
investment, it makes sense to use it as the numeraire and this implies that aggregate 
spending is given by Et≡Ct+Kt+1. To sum up, we have that: 
 


















where Eit and Pit are the total spending on and the price of the final good of industry 
i. Equation (3) states that spending shares are constant, while Equation (4) sets the 
common price of consumption and investment equal to one. 
 
Production of final goods uses labor, capital and a continuum of different 
varieties of intermediate inputs, indexed by m  for all i∈I. As usual, I interpret 
the measure of input varieties, M
] M , 0 [ it ∈
it for all i∈I, as the degree of specialization or the 
technology of the industry. This measure will be determined endogenously as part of 
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=  for  all  m∈  and i∈I  ] M , 0 [ it
 
where 0≤βi≤1, εi>1 and 0≤αi≤1; Qit is total production of final good i; qit(m) and pit(m) 
are the quantity and price of the m
th input variety of industry i; and the variables Zit 
 8are meant to capture the influence on industry productivity of geography, institutions 
and other factors that are exogenous to the analysis.
8 I loosely refer to the Zits as 
“industry productivities” and assume they vary stochastically over time within a 
support that is strictly positive and bounded above. Equation (5) states that the 
technology to produce the final good of industry i is a Cobb-Douglas function on 
human and physical capital, and intermediate inputs. The latter are aggregated with 
a standard CES function. Equation (6) states that the production of intermediates is 
also a Cobb-Douglas function on human and physical capital, and that there are 
fixed and variable costs.
9 I interpret the fixed costs as including both the costs of 
building a specialized production plant and the costs of inventing or developing a 
new variety of intermediate. An important simplifying assumption is that input 
varieties become obsolete in one generation and, as a result, all generations must 
incur these fixed costs.
10 
 
Since there are constant returns in the production of final goods, it is natural 
to assume that final good producers operate under perfect competition. Therefore, 
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Equation (7) states that price equals marginal cost, while Equation (8) uses 
Shephard’s lemma to describe the demand for intermediate inputs. Equations (5) 
and (8) imply that an increase in the price of a given input variety lowers its market 
share. But Equation (3) shows that the lost market share goes entirely to other input 
                                                  
8 Although popular, this is a quite simplistic view of the effects of geography and institutions. See 
Levchenko [2004] for an interesting discussion of alternative ways of modeling the effects of institutions. 
9 As usual, the fixed cost is paid if and only if there is strictly positive production. 
10 This assumption is crucial for tractability, since it eliminates a potentially large set of state variables, 
i.e. Mit for all i∈I. 
 9varieties of the same industry and does not affect the industry’s overall market 
share. 
 
  Since the production of intermediate inputs exhibits increasing returns that 
are internal to the firm, input producers cannot operate under perfect competition. I 
assume instead they operate under monopolistic competition with free entry. This 
has the following implications: 
 
(9) 
) m ( q
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where eit(m) is the price-elasticity of input demand:
) m ( p
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⋅ − = e  with the 
derivative in this definition being applied to Equation (8). Equation (9) states that 
monopolistic firms charge a markup over marginal cost that is decreasing on the 
demand elasticity faced by the firm. As usual, the CES formulation implies that this 
demand elasticity is equal to the elasticity of substitution among inputs, i.e. eit(m)=εi. 
Equation (10) states that profits must be zero and this is, of course, a direct 
implication of assuming free entry. 
 
  Finally, we must impose appropriate resource constraints or market-clearing 
conditions:  
 














































where Hit and Kit are the labor and capital demanded by industry i. Since the 
integrated economy is a closed economy, Equation (11) forces the aggregate supply 
of each good to match its demand, while Equations (12)-(13) state that the 
aggregate supply of labor and capital must equal their demands. The latter are the 
sum of their industry demands, and these are calculated using Shephard’s lemma. 
 
This completes the description of the model. For any admissible initial capital 
stock and sequences for St, Ht, and Zit, an equilibrium of the integrated economy 
consists of sequences of prices and quantities such that Equations (1)-(13) hold in 
all dates and states of nature. The assumptions made ensure that this equilibrium 
always exists and is unique. I shall show this by construction in the next section. 
 
The reader might be wondering why I have not formally introduced financial 
markets. I have allowed individuals to construct their own capital and use it as a 
vehicle to carry on their savings into retirement (a world of family-owned firms?). But 
I have not allowed them to trade securities in organized financial markets. The 
reason is simply to save notation. The assumptions made ensure that asset trade 
does not matter in this world economy.
 11 To see this, assume there exist 
sophisticated financial markets where all individuals can trade a wide array of state-
contingent securities. Naturally, the old would not be able to trade these securities 
since they will not be back to settle claims one period later. But the young would not 
trade with each other either. Impatient young would not be willing to trade securities 
since they do not have income in their old age and are happy to consume all their 
income during their youth. Patient young are the only ones willing and able to trade 
these securities. But they all have identical preferences and face the same 
distribution of returns to capital, and therefore they find no motive to trade with each 
other. Thus, we can safely assume the integrated economy contains sophisticated 
                                                  
11 This statement is not entirely correct. It applies to assets whose price reflects only fundamentals, but 
without additional assumptions it does not apply to securities whose price contains a bubble. I shall 
disregard the possibility of asset bubbles in this chapter, although this is far from an innocuous 
assumption. See Ventura [2002] for an example where asset bubbles have an important effect on the 
growth of the world economy and its geographical distribution. 
 11financial markets that allow individuals to enter contracts that specify exchanges of 
various quantities of the different goods to be delivered at various dates and/or 
states of nature. It just happens that these financial markets do not make any 
difference for consumption and welfare. 
 
1.2 Diminishing returns, market size and economic growth 
 
To study the forces that determine economic growth in the integrated 
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K + ≡ s . Equation (14) states that the 
(gross) growth rate of the capital stock is equal to the savings rate times the output-
capital ratio or average product of capital. If this product stays above one 
asymptotically, the world economy exhibits sustained or long run growth. Otherwise, 
economic growth eventually ceases and the world economy stagnates. We shall 
study then the determinants of savings and the average product of capital.  
 
To compute the savings rate, remember that industry i receives a share σi of 
aggregate spending of which a fraction 1-αi goes to labor. Adding across industries, 
it follows that aggregate labor income is wt⋅Ht=(1-α)⋅Qt, where α is the aggregate or 
average share of capital, i.e.  ∑
∈
α ⋅ σ ≡ α
I i
i i . Since only the patient young save, the 
savings rate consists of the fraction of labor income in the hands of patient 
consumers: 
 
 12(15)    t t S ) 1 ( s ⋅ α − =
 
Since the savings rate is bounded above, sustained economic growth requires that 
the average product of capital remain above one as the economy grows. But what 
determines the aggregate output-capital ratio? I shall answer this question in a few 
steps, so as to develop intuition. 
 
The first step consists of finding the output-capital ratio of a given industry as 
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Equation (16) shows the effects of changes in factor proportions on the 
industry’s output-capital ratio, holding constant technology. Since there are 
diminishing returns to physical and human capital in production, we find the standard 
result that increases in the physical to human capital ratio reduce the output-capital 
ratio. But technology is endogenously determined in this model, and it depends on 
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Equation (17) shows that increases in factor usage or industry size raise the 
incentives to specialize and therefore improve technology. The larger is the size of 
the market, the easier it is to recoup the fixed costs of producing a new input variety 
                                                  
12 From Equations (7) and (11) find that Pit⋅Qit=Bit, and use this to eliminate Bit from Equation (5). Then, 
solve Equation (9) with Equation (6), substitute into Equation (5) and eliminate factor prices by noting 
that the industry factor shares, i.e. wt⋅Hit/Pit⋅Qit and rt⋅Kit/Pit⋅Qit are given by 1-αi and αi, respectively. 
13 Symmetry of intermediates and perfect competition in the final goods industry implies that 
Mit⋅pit⋅qit=βi⋅Pit⋅Qit; where pit and qit are the common price and quantity of all varieties of intermediates of 
industry i. Then, use Equations (6), (9) and (10) to eliminate pit and qit from this expression. Finally, 
eliminate factor prices once again by noting that the industry factor shares are 1-αi and αi. 
 13and therefore the higher is the number of input varieties that can be sustained in 
equilibrium. We can now put these two pieces together and write the output-capital 
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= . I shall 
refer to both Zit and Ait as “industry productivities” when this is not a cause for 
confusion. Equation (18) summarizes the aggregate industry technology and shows 
direct and indirect effects of factor usage on the industry’s output-capital ratio. 
Increases in human capital raise the output-capital ratio, as the direct positive effect 
of making physical capital scarce is reinforced by the indirect effect of increasing 
input variety. Increases in physical capital have an ambiguous effect on the output-
capital ratio, as the direct negative effect of making physical capital abundant and 
the positive indirect effect of increasing input variety work in opposite directions. If 
diminishing returns are strong and market size effects are weak (µi⋅αi<1) increases in 
physical capital reduce the industry’s output-capital ratio. If instead diminishing 
returns are weak and market size effects are strong (µi⋅αi≥1) increases in physical 
capital raise the industry’s output-capital ratio. 
 
The next step is to aggregate these effects across industries. To do this, note 
first that factor allocations and aggregate output are determined as follows:
14 
 
                                                  
14 Equations (19) and (20) are direct implications of the constant factor and spending shares. One way 
to think about Equation (21) is as the definition of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate that defines 
consumption and investment and therefore underlies Equations (3) and (4). Another way of thinking 
about Equation (21) is as an implication of Equations (3), (4) and (11). 
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Equations (19) and (20) show that the equilibrium allocations of human and 
physical capital to industry i depend on the corresponding factor share and the size 
of the industry. Equation (21) says that output is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of 
industry outputs. This is, of course, the production function associated with the cost 
function in Equation (4). It is now immediate to substitute Equations (18), (19) and 
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where µ is the average value of µi, i.e.  ∑
∈
µ ⋅ σ ≡ µ
I i
i i ; υ is the covariance between µi 
and αi, i.e.  ∑
∈
α − α ⋅ µ − µ ⋅ σ ≡ υ
I i
i i i ) ( ) ( ; and At is an aggregate measure of 
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. Equation (22) is the 
aggregate production function and will play an important role in what follows. It 
shows that the industry intuitions on the effects of changes in factor usage carry on 
to the aggregate effects of changes in factor supplies. While increases in human 
capital unambiguously raise the output-capital ratio, increases in physical capital 
have ambiguous effects.
15 If the “representative” industry has strong diminishing 
returns and weak market-size effects (µ⋅α+υ<1) physical capital accumulation 
                                                  
15 Note that µ⋅(1-α)-υ≥0. 
 15reduces the aggregate output-capital ratio. If instead the “representative” industry 
has weak diminishing returns and strong market-size effects (µ⋅α+υ≥1) physical 
capital accumulation raises the output-capital ratio. 
 
   We are ready now to characterize the process of economic growth in the 
integrated economy. Substituting Equation (22) into Equation (14), we obtain the 
following law of motion for the capital stock: 
  
(23) 
υ + α ⋅ µ υ − α − ⋅ µ
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = t
) 1 (
t t t 1 t K H A s K 
 
Equation (23) shows that the integrated economy behaves as if it were a 
Solow model with a Cobb-Douglas production function that exhibits increasing 
returns to scale, i.e. the sum of the share coefficients is µ≥1. Figures 5 and 6 
illustrate the dynamics of the stock of physical capital with the help of two simple 
examples. The first example is the “deterministic” world where savings, human 
capital and productivity are constant over time, i.e. {st,Ht,At}={s,H,A} for all t. The 
second example is the “stochastic” world where savings, human capital and 
productivity fluctuate between a “bad” state with {st,Ht,At}={sB,HB,AB} and a “good” 
state with {st,Ht,At}={sG,HG,AG}; with 
υ − α − ⋅ µ υ − α − ⋅ µ ⋅ ⋅ > ⋅ ⋅
) 1 ( ) 1 ( H A s H A s B B B G G G . The central 
point of these examples is to show that economic growth solves a tension between 
diminishing returns and market size effects. 
 
Figure 5 shows the case in which diminishing returns are strong and market-
size effects are weak, i.e. µ⋅α+υ<1. The top panel depicts the evolution of the 
“deterministic” world. There is a unique steady state and the stock of physical capital 
converges monotonically towards it from any initial position. The steady state is 
stable because increases (decreases) in the stock of physical capital lower (raise) 
the output-capital ratio and lead to a lower (higher) growth rate. The bottom panel 
shows that the “stochastic” world exhibits similar dynamics, with the stock of physical 
capital monotonically converging to a steady state interval, rather than a steady state 
 16value. Once the stock of physical capital is trapped within this interval, its growth rate 
fluctuates between positive and negative values and averages zero in the long run. 
These examples illustrate why sustained growth is not possible if diminishing returns 
are strong and market size effects are weak. 
 
Figure 6 shows the case in which diminishing returns are weak and market-
size effects are strong, i.e. µ⋅α+υ≥1. The top panel shows the “deterministic” world 
again. There is unique steady state that is unstable. If the stock of physical capital 
starts above the steady state, it grows without bound at an accelerating rate. If it 
starts below, the stock of physical capital contracts over time also at an accelerating 
rate. The steady state is now unstable because increases (decreases) in the stock of 
physical capital raise (lower) the output-capital ratio and lead to a higher (lower) 
growth rate. The bottom panel shows that the “stochastic” world also exhibits similar 
dynamics. One difference however is that there is no steady state. Instead, there is a 
threshold interval. If the stock of physical capital is above (below) this interval, it 
grows (contracts) at an accelerating rate. If the stock of physical capital starts within 
the threshold interval, it fluctuates within it until it eventually exits. This happens with 
probability one, and only luck determines when this exit occurs and whether the 
world economy exits above and enters an expansionary path or, alternatively, it exits 
below and enters a contractionary path. Therefore, sustained growth is possible (but 
not necessary) if diminishing returns are weak and market size effects are strong. 
 
  This model suggests a simple account of the history of the world economy 
since the 1500s. It is based on the “stochastic” world of Figure 6 and it goes as 
follows: for centuries, the size of the world economy was too small to generate 
sustained growth. Located within the threshold interval, the world economy was 
subject to periodic expansions and contractions with virtually zero average growth. 
This is consistent with Maddison’s calculation that the world economy grew only 
about eighteen percent from 1500 to 1820. But this was an unstable situation in the 
very long run. The Industrial Revolution marks the moment in which, after a series of 
favorable shocks, the world economy reached enough size to exit the threshold 
 17interval and started traveling on the path of accelerating growth reported in Figure 1. 
As a result of this successful exit, the world economy grew more than seven hundred 
and fifty percent from 1820 to 1998. 
 
  Although suggestive, this account is far too sketchy and incomplete to be 
taken seriously. Moreover, I find highly improbable that the last five hundred years of 
the world economy can be understood in terms of a model that postulates negligible 
costs of transporting goods and factors and constant world population. Surely the 
demographic revolution and the process of globalization have both played central 
roles in shaping the growth process during this period. This chapter is not the place 
for a discussion of the growth effects of the demographic revolution.
16 But it is 
definitely the place to study the growth effects of globalization, and we turn to this 
topic next. 
 
1.3 The effects of economic integration 
 
  Assume the world economy initially consisted of many regions or locations 
separated by geographical obstacles that made the costs of transporting goods and 
factors among them prohibitive. As a result, these regions were forced to live in 
autarky. I index these regions by c∈C, and let them differ on their savings, human 
capital, industry productivities and initial capital stock, i.e. on Sc,t, Hc,t, Zc,it and Kc,0. 
When this does not lead to confusion, I shall use C to refer to both the set of regions 
and also to the number of regions. Throughout, I denote world aggregates by 
omitting the region sub-index. Typically, world aggregates refer to the sum of all 
corresponding regional variables. For instance, world aggregate savings, human and 
                                                  
16 In this model, a sustained increase in population would generate sustained growth even if α⋅µ+υ<1.  
The reason is that, holding constant both factor endowments and productivity, population growth 
increases the size of the market and this raises income. I have ruled out this possibility by simply 
assuming that the world population is constant. Given the purpose of this chapter, I think this is not a 
“crucial” assumption. But it might be so in other contexts. See Jones’ chapter in this volume for a 
thorough and clear discussion of scale effects in growth models. 












t , c t K K . But there will be 
some exceptions. For instance, the relationship between Zc,it and the corresponding 
world aggregate Zit is a bit more intricate and will be explained shortly. 
 
Although it is not really necessary to take a stand on the geographical 
distribution of population, I assume throughout that it is equally distributed across 
regions. This simplifies somewhat the presentation since absolute and per capita 
regional comparisons coincide. For instance, if Sc,t>Sc’,t then c also has higher 
savings per person than c’. Note also that, as the number of regions becomes 
arbitrarily large, the size of each of them becomes arbitrarily small and the effects of 
shocks to their characteristics on world aggregates become arbitrarily small. This 
limiting case is usually referred to as the small economy assumption. 
 
The model of globalization considered here is embarrassingly simple: at date 
t=0, all the geographical obstacles to trade suddenly disappear forever and the costs 
of transporting goods and factors fall from prohibitive to negligible. What are the 
effects of such a dramatic reduction in transport costs on world economic growth and 
its geographical distribution? To answer this question, we must characterize the 
growth process in the autarkic world economy and in the integrated world economy 
and compare them. Although this way of modeling globalization and its effects is 
almost a caricature, it turns out to be quite useful to develop intuitions that survive as 
we move to more sophisticated and realistic models. 
 
  In the world of autarky, each region constituted a smaller version of the 
integrated economy. Therefore, the world economy at t<0 can be described by:
17 
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17 Equation (25) is an analogue to Equation (23), while Equation (24) follows from the region 
counterparts to Equation (22) and the fact that Yc,t=Qc,t=Cc,t+Kc,t in autarky. 
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where Yc,t is the income of the region and, in autarky, it coincides with its production 
and spending, i.e. Yc,t=Qc,t=Ec,t; and Ac,t is the corresponding measure of regional 
productivity,  i.e.  ∏
∈
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= . Equations (24) and (25) have been discussed at 
length already and need no further comment. 
 
In the integrated economy it is not possible in general to determine the 
production or spending located in a given region. Since goods and factors can move 
at negligible cost, any geographical distribution of production and factors that 
ensures all production takes place in the regions with the highest industry 
productivity is a possible equilibrium. Despite this indeterminacy, prices and 
aggregate quantities are uniquely determined as shown in section 1.2. This means 
that it is possible to track the stock of physical capital owned by the original 
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for all c∈C and t≥0; and At is a measure of world productivity. Remember that we 
have now specified a set of industry productivities for each region, Zc,it. But we only 
specified one set of industry productivities for the integrated economy in section 1.1. 
                                                  
18 Equation (26) follows from adding the income from human and physical capital of the inhabitants of 
the region, and noting that aggregate or world shares of human and physical capital are constant and 
equal to 1-α and α, respectively. Equation (27) follows from Equations (1) and (23), and the observation 
that wages are the same for all productive workers of the world. Without loss of generality, I keep 
assuming that there is no trade in securities. 
 20The reason was that industries never locate in a region that offers less than the 
highest possible productivity. As a result, in the integrated world economy the only 
industry productivities that matter are the highest ones, i.e. Z } Z { max it , c it
C c∈
= . This 
implies that At≥Ac,t for all c∈C, and we can interpret aggregate productivity not as 
average productivity, but instead as the highest possible productivity or the world 
productivity frontier. With this in mind, Equation (27) traces the holdings of capital of 
the original inhabitants of region c and their descendants, while Equation (26) 
describes their income. 
 
We are ready now to examine the growth effects of economic integration. 
Consider first the static or impact effects on the incomes of regions. A bit of 
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where   is the actual income of the inhabitants of region c at date t=0, and   i s  
the income they would have had at date t=0 if globalization had not taken place. 
Since each of the terms in Equation (28) is non-negative, the first result we obtain is 
that the overall impact or static gains from economic integration are non-negative as 
well. 
I
0 , c Y
A
0 , c Y
 
  These gains can be decomposed into three sources corresponding to each of 
the terms of Equation (28). The first one shows the growth of income that results 
                                                  
19 To derive this expression I have assumed a zero cross-industry correlation between αi and µi, i.e. 
υ=0. This parameter restriction is useful because it allows us to unambiguously disentangle the 
“increased-market-size” and “improved-factor-allocation” effects. 
 21from moving industries from low to high productivity locations. This term would 
vanish if region c had the highest productivity in all industries. The second term 
shows the growth of income that results from relocating factors away from those 
regions and/or industries in which they were abundant in autarky into those in which 
they were scarce. This term would vanish if region c had world average factor 
proportions. The third term shows the growth in income that is due to an increase in 
market size that allows industries to support a higher degree of specialization. This 
term would vanish if the size of region c were arbitrarily large with respect to the rest 
of the world. An implication of Equation (28) is that the static gains from economic 
integration are greater for regions with low productivity, extreme factor proportions 
and modest amounts of physical and human capital. 
 
  If coupled with an appropriate transfer scheme, globalization leads to a 
Pareto improvement in the world economy. Equation (28) shows that, with the same 
production factors, the integrated economy generates more output than the world of 
autarky. It is therefore possible to implement a transfer scheme that keeps constant 
the income of all current and future young and gives more income to all current and 
future old. Under this transfer scheme, investment and the stock of physical capital 
would be unaffected by economic integration. But the production and consumption of 
all generations born at date t=0 or later would increase. Of course, there exist many 
alternative transfer schemes that ensure that globalization benefits all. Moreover, 
since each region gains from trade there exist Pareto-improving transfer schemes 
that can be implemented without the need for inter-regional transfers. That is, 
ensuring that globalization generates a Pareto improvement does not require 
compensation from one region to another. 
 
  How “large” the transfer scheme must be to ensure that economic integration 
leads to a Pareto improvement? The answer is “not much” if most of the gains from 
economic integration come from higher productivity and increased market size. The 
reason is that in this case all factors share in the gains from integration. The required 
transfer scheme could be “substantial” if the gains from integration come mostly from 
 22improved factor allocation. This is because within each region the owners of the 
abundant factor obtain more than proportional gains from integration while the 
owners of the region’s scarce factor might have losses. In this case, implementing a 
Pareto improvement requires a transfer from the former to the latter.  
 
  Without a transfer scheme, it is relatively straightforward to trace the dynamic 
effects of economic integration. Assume for simplicity that the world contains many 
symmetric regions so that before integration all of them had the same law of motion. 
The top panel of Figure 7 shows the effects of economic integration in the 
“deterministic” world when diminishing returns are strong and market size effects are 
weak. Economic integration raises the steady state stock of physical capital and sets 
up a period of high growth that eventually ends. It is straightforward to see that the 
effects would be similar in the “stochastic” world, with economic integration 
permanently raising the steady state interval. Using the jargon of growth theory, if 
µ⋅α+υ<1 economic integration has level effects on income. The bottom panel of 
Figure 7 shows the opposite case in which diminishing returns are weak and market 
size effects are strong. In this case, economic integration shifts down the steady 
state value, increasing the growth rate permanently. Once again, it is straightforward 
to see that the effects would be similar in the “stochastic” world, with trade shifting 
the threshold interval to the left. Using again the jargon of growth theory, if µ⋅α+υ≥1 
integration has growth effects on income. 
 
It is tempting now to revisit our earlier account of the history of the world 
economy since the 1500s, and propose an alternative version which is also based 
on the “stochastic” world with µ⋅α+υ>1. It goes as follows: for centuries, the world 
economy consisted of a collection of autarkic regions that were too small to sustain 
economic growth. Located within the threshold interval, these regions were subject 
to periodic expansions and contractions with virtually zero average growth. Once 
again, this is consistent with Maddison’s calculation that the world economy grew 
only about eighteen percent from 1500 to 1820. The Industrial Revolution occurs 
when a series of reductions in trade costs between some British regions raised their 
 23combined size above the threshold interval and set them on the path of accelerating 
growth. As time went on, more and more regions joined the initial core and the 
Industrial Revolution spread throughout Britain and moved into France, Germany 
and beyond. It is therefore a reduction of trade costs and the progressive extension 
of markets that made possible sustained growth and allowed the world economy to 
grow more than seven hundred and fifty percent from 1820 to 1998. This might also 




This view of the development process is also broadly consistent with the 
general observations about inequality between center and periphery discussed in the 
introduction. Regions that join the integrated economy (the “center”) become rich 
and take off into steady growth. Regions that do not join the integrated economy (the 
“periphery”) are left behind, technologically backward and capital poor. As more and 
more regions enter the integrated economy, those that are left behind become 
relatively poorer and world inequality increases. Eventually all regions will enter the 
integrated economy and world inequality will decline. Therefore, this model 
generates an inverted U-shape or Kuznets curve, with world inequality rising in the 
first stages of world development and declining later. Pritchett [1997], Bourguignon 
and Morrison [2002] and others have shown that world inequality has increased from 
1820 to now. It remains to be seen if this inequality will decline in the future. 
 
This stylized model also illustrates some of the conflicts that globalization 
might create. It follows from Equation (28) that the gains from trade are large for 
regions whose factor proportions are far from the world average. Ceteris paribus, 
this means that regions in the center would like that new entrants into the integrated 
economy to move the world average factor proportions away from them. In fact, 
unless productivity and market size effects are substantial, the entry of a large region 
creates losses to other regions with similar factor proportions. This implies, for 
instance, that the Chinese process of economic integration should be seen with 
                                                  
20 The word “might” reflects the earlier observation that regional production and therefore trade is 
indeterminate in the integrated economy. 
 24some concern in countries with similar factor proportions such as Mexico and 
Indonesia, but with hope in the European Union or the United States. 
 
This view of globalization and growth leads to a powerful prescription for 
economic development: open up and integrate into the world economy. I believe this 
is a fundamentally sound policy prescription, and history is largely consistent with it. 
But there are a number of important qualifications that this stylized model cannot 
capture. Integrating into the world economy is not an “all-or-nothing” type of affair in 
which regions move overnight from autarky to complete integration. The process of 
economic integration is slow and full of treacherous steps. Obtaining general 
prescriptions for development in a world of imperfect integration has proved to be a 
much more challenging task. I shall come back to this important point later, but we 
must first introduce trade frictions into the story. 
 
 
2. Specialization, trade and diminishing returns 
 
Let us revise our model of globalization. As in section 1.3, assume that at 
date t=0 the costs of transporting goods across regions suddenly fall from prohibitive 
to negligible. Unlike section 1.3, assume now that the costs of transporting factors 
across regions remain prohibitive after date t=0. An implication of this setup is that 
globalization equalizes goods prices across regions, but it does not necessarily 
equalize factor prices. This particular view of globalization has a longstanding 
tradition in trade theory and the goal of this section is to analyze it. 
 
Assuming that human capital is immobile internationally is somewhat dubious, 
as there are some well-known examples of large contingents of people working 
overseas. But most of the results discussed here would go through with only minor 
changes under the weaker and reasonably realistic assumption that international 
 25flows of people are quantity constrained, although not necessarily at zero.
21 
Assuming that physical capital is immobile is appropriate for buildings and structures 
and, probably, not too unreasonable for the most important types of machinery and 
equipment. Moreover, assuming that existing physical capital cannot be transported 
does not preclude physical capital to effectively “move” across regions over time, as 




If physical capital is immobile, pieces of capital located in different regions 
might offer different return distributions. This opens up a role for financial markets. 
Although the old and the impatient young still have no incentive to trade securities, 
the patient young now have a motive. Those that are located in regions where 
physical capital offers an attractive distribution of returns want to sell securities and 
use the proceeds to finance additional purchases of domestic physical capital. Those 
patient young that are located in regions where physical capital offers an unattractive 
distribution of returns want to buy securities and reduce their holdings of domestic 
physical capital. And, regardless of their location, the patient young want to buy and 
sell securities in order to share regional risks. Thus, the immobility of physical capital 
creates a potentially important role for international financial markets: the 
geographical reallocation of investments and production risks. 
 
Despite this, I will not let international financial markets play this role. This 
failure of financial markets could be due to technological motives or informational 
problems of various sorts. But I prefer instead to think of it as being caused by lack 
of incentives to enforce international contracts. In the integrated economy, 
                                                  
21 Of course, this becomes a weak or empty excuse if quantity constraints respond to economic 
incentives in a systematic way. See Lundborg and Segerstrom [2002] and Ortega [2004] for models in 
which this happens. 
22 Remember that we have assumed that physical capital depreciates in one generation. Therefore, 
assuming physical capital is immobile only means that it is not possible at date t to move around the 
stock of physical capital created and deployed at date t-1, and that is being used for production at date 
t. But it is certainly possible to choose where to deploy the new stock of physical capital created at date 
t that will be used for production at date t+1. The effects of physical capital immobility would be more 
severe quantitatively with a slower rate of depreciation. Note also that immobility matters only because 
physical capital is irreversible or putty-clay. In fact, it would be logically inconsistent to assume that 
physical capital is immobile if it could be converted back into mobile goods. 
 26individuals could enter into contracts that specify exchanges of various quantities of 
the different goods to be delivered at various dates and/or states of nature. It is 
standard convention to refer to the signing of contracts that involve only 
contemporaneous deliveries as “goods” trade, while the signing of contracts that 
involve future (and perhaps state contingent) deliveries is usually referred to as 
“asset” trade. Both types of trade require sufficiently low costs of transporting goods. 
But asset trade also requires that the signing parties credibly commit to fulfill their 
future contractual obligations. The domestic court system punishes those that violate 
contracts, thus creating the credibility or trust that serves as the foundation for 
domestic financial markets. But there is no international court system that endows 
sovereigns with the same sort of credibility, and this hampers international financial 
markets. I assume next this problem is so severe that it precludes all asset trade. 
 
  Unlike the integrated economy, in the world analyzed in this section each 
region’s total production, spending and capital stock are always determined. Since 
trade balances and current accounts are zero, the income of each region equals the 
value of both its production and spending, i.e. Yc,t=Qc,t=Ec,t. Since the only vehicle for 
savings available to the young is physical capital, analogues to Equations (1)-(2) 
apply to each region. We can therefore write regional incomes and the laws of 
motion of regional capital stocks as follows: 
 
(29)     for  all  c∈C  t , c t , c t , c t , c t , c K r H w Y ⋅ + ⋅ =
(30)       for all c∈C  t , c t , c t , c 1 t , c H w S K ⋅ ⋅ = +
 
These Equations apply to all the models of this section, including the world of 
autarky before globalization. Therefore, a complete analysis of the world income 
distribution and its evolution requires us to determine the cross-section of factor 
prices, i.e. wc,t  and rc,t as a function of the state of the world economy. The latter 
consists of the savings, factor endowments and industry productivities of all regions 
 27of the world, i.e. Sc,t, Hc,t, Kc,t and Zc,it  for all i∈I and all c∈C; plus the date, since trade 
in goods is only possible if t≥0. 
 
  The rest of this section is organized as follows. Sub-section 2.1 studies 
further the world of autarky, while the rest of the section studies the world after 
globalization. In sub-section 2.2, we explore a world in which frictions to factor 
mobility and asset trade are not binding after globalization. Sub-section 2.3 provides 
a formal description of the model. Sub-sections 2.4 and 2.5 examine worlds where 
frictions to factor mobility and asset trade remain binding after globalization. 
 
2.1 Economic growth in autarky 
 
The analysis of the effects of globalization starts in the world of autarky. As 
explained in section 1.3, before globalization each region is a smaller and less 
efficient version of the integrated economy and factor prices can be written as:
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Equations (31)-(32) describe the cross-section of factor prices. Holding 
constant factor endowments, regions with higher than average industry productivities 
have higher than average factor prices. Holding constant industry productivities, the 
relationship between factor prices and factor endowments depends on two familiar 
forces: diminishing returns and market size. For a given set of industry technologies, 
an increase in one factor makes this factor relatively more abundant, lowering its 
price and raising the price of the other factor. But an increase in one factor also 
raises income and demand in all industries, improving industry technologies and 
                                                  
23 These Equations follow from Equation (24) and the observation that the shares of human capital and 
physical capital are 1-α and α. 
 28raising the prices of both factors. Equations (31)-(32) put these two effects together. 
Hence, regions with higher-than-average human capital have higher-than-average 
rental rates for all parameter values, and also higher-than-average wages if µ⋅(1-α)-
υ>1. Similarly, regions with higher-than-average physical capital have higher-than-
average wages for all parameter values, and also higher-than-average rental rates if 
µ⋅α+υ>1. 
 
It follows from Equations (29)-(32) that, before globalization, we can write 
regional incomes and capital stocks as follows:
24 
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Equation (33) shows the income of regions, and it can be used to determine 
the relative contribution of factor endowments and productivity to income differences. 
For instance, assume income is λ times higher than average in a given region. It 
could be that in this region human capital is λ
1/(µ⋅(1-α)-υ) higher than average or that 
physical capital is λ
1/(µ⋅α+υ) higher than average. It could also be that the region’s 
productivity in industry i is   times higher than average.
i i / 1 µ ⋅ σ λ
25 Naturally, it could also 
be any combination of these factors. 
 
Equation (34) is the law of motion of the capital stocks and can be used to 
analyze the dynamic response to a region-specific shock to savings, human capital 
and/or industry productivity. Positive (and permanent) shocks to any of these 
variables raise the region’s capital stock and income. As Equation (34) shows, these 
shocks have growth effects if α⋅µ+υ≥1, but only have level effects if α⋅µ+υ<1. 
Regardless of the case, the effects of these shocks never spill over to other regions. 
                                                  
24 These Equations are identical to Equations (24)-(25) and have been reproduced here only for 
convenience. 
25 Here industry productivity means Zc,it, and not Ac,it. 
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Assume the joint distribution of savings, human capital and industry 
productivities is stationary. Then, Equations (33)-(34) imply a strong connection 
between the cross-sectional and time-series properties of the growth process.. If 
diminishing returns are strong and market size effects are weak, i.e. if µ⋅α+υ<1, 
world average income (Yt) and its regional distribution (Yc,t/Yt) are both stationary. If 
instead diminishing returns are weak and market size effects are strong, i.e. 
µ⋅α+υ>1, world average income and its regional distribution are both non-stationary. 
This result provides a tight link between the long run properties of the growth 
process and the stability of the world income distribution. A weaker version of this 
result assumes that the world productivity frontier (At) is non-stationary but regional 
productivity gaps (Ac,t/At) are stationary. Under this assumption, world average 
income is non-stationary even if diminishing returns are strong and market size 
effects are weak. 
 
It is commonplace among growth theorists to interpret cross-country data 
from the vantage point of the autarky model.
26 One influential example is the work of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992]. They combined Equations (33)-(34) to obtain an 
Equation relating income to savings, human capital, country productivity, and lagged 
income; and estimated it using data for a large cross-section of countries. They 
interpreted the residuals of this regression as measuring differences in country 
productivities and measurement error, and concluded that differences in savings and 
human capital explain (in a statistical sense) about 80 percent of the cross-country 
variation in income. Their procedure imposed the restriction µ=1 (and therefore υ=0) 
and yielded an estimate of α of about two thirds. Hall and Jones [1999] and Klenow 
and Rodríguez-Clare [1997] interpreted this high estimate of α as a signal that the 
regression was miss-specified. Their argument was that savings, human capital and 
productivity were positively correlated and the omission of productivity from the 
                                                  
26 Unfortunately, the absence of direct and reliable measures of productivity precludes carrying out 
formal tests of the theory. The most popular empirical response to this problem has been to simply 
assume the theory is correct and use available data to make inferences about the determinants of the 
world income distribution and its evolution. 
 30regression biased upwards the estimate of α. These authors used Equations (33)-
(34) to calibrate country productivities keeping the assumption that µ=1, but instead 
imposing a value of α of about one third.
27 With these productivities at hand, they 
found that about two thirds of the variation in incomes reflects variation in 
productivity, and only one third can be attributed to cross-country variation in savings 
and human capital. 
 
Another influential example of the use of the autarky model to interpret 
available data is Barro [1991] who found that, after controlling for human capital and 
saving rates, poor countries tend to grow faster than rich ones. This finding has been 
labeled  “conditional convergence” since it implies that, if two countries have the 
same country characteristics, they converge to the same level of income.
28 If 
Equations (33)-(34) provide a good description of the real world, observing 
conditional convergence is akin to finding that µ⋅α+υ<1.
29 Many have therefore 
interpreted the conditional convergence finding as evidence that diminishing returns 
are strong relative to market size effects. 
 
These inferences about the nature of the growth process heavily rely on 
Equations (33)-(34), and these Equations have been derived from a theoretical 
model that assumes that all regions of the world live in autarky. This assumption is 
obviously unrealistic. Is it also crucial? And if so, what alternative assumption would 
be reasonably realistic? I next turn to these questions. But the script should not be 
surprising. Globalization (as described at the beginning of this section) has profound 
effects on the world income distribution and its evolution. The newfound ability of 
regions to specialize and trade alters, sometimes quite dramatically, the effects of 
                                                  
27 This value corresponds to the share of capital in income in national accounts. This sort of calibration 
exercise is known as development accounting. Caselli’s chapter in this volume is the definitive source 
on this topic. 
28 As Barro himself emphasized, this does not mean that per capita incomes tend to converge 
unconditionally since countries with high initial incomes also tend to have good country characteristics. 
There is a large number of papers that try to determine whether there is conditional convergence and 
measure how fast it takes place. See, for instance, Knight, Loayza and Villanueva [1993] and Caselli, 
Esquivel and Lefort [1996]. 
29 An additional maintained assumption of this line of research is that savings, human capital and 
productivity are jointly stationary. 
 31factor endowments and industry productivities on factor prices. This is most clearly 
illustrated in subsection 2.2, which depicts a world in which goods trade allows the 
world economy to replicate the prices and allocations of the integrated economy. Of 
course, this is not a general feature of goods trade. Subsection 2.3 prepares the 
ground for the analysis of worlds where economic integration is imperfect and factor 
prices vary across regions. This analysis is then performed in subsections 2.4 and 
2.5. 
 
2.2 Factor price equalization 
 
A good starting point for the analysis of the world economy after globalization 
is to ask whether restricting factor mobility matters at all. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
answer is “perhaps not”. As Paul Samuelson [1948, 1949] showed more than half a 
century ago, goods trade might be all that is needed to ensure global efficiency. 
When this happens, we say that the equalization of goods prices leads to the 
equalization of factor prices. I shall describe Samuelson’s result and its implications 
step by step, so as to develop intuition.
30 
 
Consider the set of all possible partitions of the world factor endowments at 
date t, Ht and Kt, among the different regions of the world or, for short, the set of all 
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Define FPEt as the subset of Dt for which the world economy replicates the 
prices and allocations of the integrated economy. To construct FPEt, fix dt
                                                
∈Dt and 
consider the integrated economy prices and quantities. At these prices, consumers 
 
30 The analysis here follows a long tradition in international trade. See Norman and Dixit [1989], 
Helpman and Krugman [1985] and Davis [1995]. 
 32are willing to purchase the integrated economy quantities of the different goods and 
also have enough income to do so. At these prices, producers located in regions 
with the highest industry productivities are willing to produce the integrated economy 
quantities of the different goods using the integrated economy quantities of factors. If 
these producers can find these quantities of factors in their regions, the integrated 
economy prices and quantities are in fact the equilibrium ones and we say that 
dt∈FPEt. Otherwise, the integrated economy prices and quantities cannot be the 
equilibrium ones and we say that dt∉FPEt. Therefore, the set FPEt can be formally 
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where Mit, Hit and Kit are defined in Equations (17), (19) and (20). To understand this 
definition, interpret xc,it as the share of the world production of industry i located in 
region c at date t; and note that this share includes the production of intermediate 
inputs,  , and final goods,  . Definition (36) then says that d ) m ( x it , c
F
it , c x t∈FPEt if it is 
possible to achieve full employment of human and physical capital in all regions 
producing only in those regions with the highest productivity (requirement R1), using 
the same factor proportions as in the integrated economy (requirement R2), and 
without incurring the fixed cost of production more than once (requirement R3). The 
set FPEt is never empty since the factor distribution that applies in the integrated 
economy always belongs to it. In fact, the set FPEt consists of all the factor 
 33distributions that are equilibria of the integrated economy. The larger is the size of 
the indeterminacy in the geographical distribution of production and factors of the 
integrated economy, the larger is the size of FPEt. 
 
  The patterns of production and trade that support factor price equalization 
after globalization are easy to state and quite intuitive: 
 
 
1.  In regions where human (physical) capital is relatively abundant, production 
shifts towards industries that, on average, use human (physical) capital 
intensively. Excess production in these industries is converted into exports that 
finance imports of industries that use physical (human) capital intensively. 
 
 





K=∅. Assume αi=αH if i∈I
H, and αi=αK if i∈I
K; and αH<αK; and βi=0 
for all i∈I. All regions have the same industry productivities, but A-regions have a 
higher ratio of human to physical capital than B-regions. Factor price equalization is 
possible if the differences in factor proportions between A- and B-regions are not too 
large relative to the differences in factor proportions between H- and K-industries. 
Figure 8 shows the geometry of this example. Since all regions have the same factor 
costs, industries use the same factor proportions in all regions. A-regions contain a 
more than proportional fraction of the integrated economy’s H-industry, and a less 
than proportional fraction of the K-industry. The opposite happens in B-regions. This 
is how specialization and trade ensure that in this world economy factor endowments 
are used efficiently. 
 
 
2.  In industries where a region’s productivity is less than the world’s highest, 
production falls to zero and domestic spending shifts towards imports. To finance 
 34the latter, production expands in industries in which the region has the highest 
possible productivity and the excess production is exported abroad.         
 
 





K=∅. Assume αi=αH if i∈I
H, and αi=αK if i∈I
K; and αH<αK; and βi=0 
for all i∈I. Within each type there are “advanced” and “backward” industries.  A-
regions have the highest possible productivity in all industries, regardless of whether 
they are “advanced” or “backward”. B-regions have the highest possible productivity 
only in “backward” industries. Factor price equalization is possible if the combined 
factor endowments of A-regions are large enough and the subset of “advanced” 
industries is not too large. Figure 9 shows the geometry of this example. Since all 
regions have the same factor costs, only producers located in regions with the 
highest productivity can survive international competition. A-regions produce the 
integrated economy quantities of “advanced” goods and a fraction of the integrated 
economy quantities of “backward” goods. B-regions produce the remaining 
quantities of “backward” goods. This is how specialization and trade ensure that in 




3.  Within each industry, only one region produces each input variety and exports it 
to all other regions. If an industry is split among various regions, there is likely to 




 Example  2.1.3: Consider any of the world economies of the previous examples, 
but assume now that βi=1 for all i∈I. Assume dt
                                                
∈FPEt. Since the fixed costs of 
 
31 I say “likely to be” because a region might produce the final good for domestic use, and import the 
necessary input varieties. It is usual in trade models to set βi=1 and then drop the “likely to be” from the 
statement. 
 35producing inputs contain the cost of building a specialized production plant, all input 
producers choose to concentrate their production in one region in order not to 
duplicate these costs. Therefore, each region produces a disjoint set of input 
varieties. This is how specialization and trade allow the world economy to exploit 
increasing returns to scale and therefore benefit from a larger market size. 
 
 
By adopting these patterns of specialization and trade, the world economy is 
able to reap all the benefits of economic integration without any factor movements. 
Using the jargon of trade theory, goods trade is a “perfect substitute” for factor 
movements if dt∈FPEt. When this is the case, factor prices are given by: 
 
(37)     for all c∈C 
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The world economy is able to operate at the same level of efficiency as the 
integrated economy despite the immobility of factors. Equations (31)-(32) showed 
that, before globalization, cross-regional differences in factor proportions and 
industry productivities lead to differences in the way industries operate (i.e. their 
factor proportions and productivity) and also in the size of their markets. Regions 
with a high ratio of human to physical capital have high wage-rental ratios. Regions 
with high industry productivities and abundant human and physical capital have high 
factor prices. But Equations (37)-(38) show that, after globalization (and if dt∈FPEt), 
cross-regional differences in factor proportions and industry productivities neither 
change the way industries operate, nor do they affect the size of their markets. 
Goods trade allows regions to absorb their differences in factor endowments and 
industry productivities by specializing in those industries that use their abundant 
factors and have the highest possible productivity, without the need for having 
different factor prices. Goods trade also eliminates the effects of regional size on 
factor prices by creating global markets. 
 36  
  These observations have important implications for the world income 
distribution and, consequently, for any attempt to determine the relative contribution 
of factor endowments and productivity to income differences. Substituting Equations 
(37)-(38) into Equation (29), we find that: 
 
(39) 
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A comparison between these Equations and Equation (33) shows that the 
relative contribution of factor endowments and productivity to income differences is 
fundamentally affected by globalization. Equation (33) differs from Equations (39)-
(40) in three important respects: the elasticity of substitution between domestic 
human and physical capital is one in Equation (33) but infinite in Equations (39)-(40); 
domestic productivity appears in Equation (34) but not in Equations (39)-(40); and 
income is homogeneous of degree µ on domestic factor endowments in Equation 
(34) but only of degree one in Equation (39)-(40). Each of these differences echoes 
a different aspect of globalization, and I shall discuss them in turn. 
 
Globalization raises the elasticity of substitution between human and physical 
capital from one to infinity because structural transformation (a shift towards 
industries that use the abundant factor) replaces factor deepening (forcing industries 
to use more of the locally abundant factor) as a mechanism to absorb differences in 
factor proportions. Assume a region has a ratio of human to physical capital λ times 
higher than average. Before globalization, each of its industries is forced to operate 
with a ratio of human to physical capital that is λ times average, and this requires a 
wage-rental ratio that is λ
-1 times average. After globalization, the region simply 
shifts its production towards industries that are human-capital intensive, keeping the 
ratio of human to physical capital of its industries constant. This does not require 
changes in the wage-rental ratio. 
 37 
Globalization eliminates differences in industry productivities as a source of 
income differences because structural transformation (a shift towards industries that 
have high productivity) also replaces productivity deepening (forcing low-productivity 
industries to produce) as a mechanism to absorb differences in industry 
productivities. Assume now that a region has average factor endowments but higher 
than average industry productivities. For instance, the region’s productivity is λ times 
higher than the rest of the world in a subset of industries of combined size σ, and 
equal to the rest of the world in the remaining ones. Before globalization, this 
productivity advantage allows the region to produce λ
σ⋅µ output than average with the 
same factors, holding constant technology. After globalization, the region takes over 
all world production of those industries in which its productivity is higher and scales 
back the rest of its industries. This allows the rest of the world to take full advantage 
of the region’s high productivity and catch up with it in terms of income (even though 
not in productivity). 
 
Globalization reduces the effects of factor endowments on relative incomes 
because it converts regional markets into global ones. Assume now that a region 
has average industry productivities, but its human and physical capitals are both λ 
times above average. Before globalization, the region’s higher factor endowments 
allow it to produce more output than the average region. This effect is further 
reinforced because the region’s larger market size allows it to have a better 
technology than average. Therefore, in autarky the region’s income is λ
µ times 
higher than the world’s average. After globalization, this additional market size effect 
disappears since the relevant market is the world market and this is the same for all 
regions. Therefore, after globalization the region’s income is only λ times higher than 
the world average income. 
 
  Globalization also influences the dynamics of the world economy. Assume 
dt∈FPEt for all t, then it follows from Equation (30) and (37)-(38) that: 
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A comparison between these Equations and Equation (34) shows how 
globalization affects the dynamic responses to region-specific shocks. After 
globalization, positive (and permanent) shocks to savings and human capital still 
raise a region’s capital stock and income. But now the effects of these shocks spill 
over to other regions. Shocks to productivity can only affect a region’s income if they 




Another important implication of Equations (39)-(42) is that globalization 
breaks down the connection between the long run properties of the growth process 
and the stability of the world income distribution.
33 Assume again that the joint 
distribution of savings, human capital and productivities is stationary. Then, Equation 
(41) shows that it still is the relative strength of diminishing returns and market size 
effects that determines whether world average income is stationary or not. But 
Equation (42) shows that now the world distribution of capital stocks is stationary 
regardless of parameter values. The same applies to the world income distribution 
(see Equation (40)). Therefore, all regions share a common growth rate in the long 
run. The reason is simple: physical capital accumulation in high-savings and high-
human capital regions is absorbed by increased production in industries that use 
physical capital intensively, and this lowers the prices of these industries and 
increases the prices of industries that use human capital intensively. This increases 
wages and savings in low-savings and low-human capital regions. In a nutshell, 
                                                  
32 See Ventura [1997] and Atkeson and Kehoe [2000] for analyses of shocks to small open economies 
in the factor-price-equalization world. 
33 Ventura [1997] provides a dramatic example of this by constructing a world in which time-series 
convergence to a steady state is associated with cross-sectional divergence and vice versa. 
 39movements in goods prices positively transmit growth across regions and ensure the 
stability of the world income distribution.
 34 
 
The main feature of the factor-price-equalization world is that diminishing 
returns and market size effects are global and not local. This observation has 
important implications for growth theory. Explanations for why the world grows faster 
today than in the past should feature diminishing returns and market size effects in 
the lead role, and relegate savings and human capital to a secondary one. But 
explanations of why some countries grow faster than others should do exactly the 
opposite, giving the lead role to savings and human capital and relegating 
diminishing returns and market size effects to a secondary role. A distinctive feature 
of the integrated economy is therefore a sharp disconnect between the determinants 
of average or long run growth and the determinants the dispersion or the cross-
section of growth rates.
35 
 
The factor-price-equalization world neatly illustrates the potential effects of 
trade on the world income distribution and its dynamics, and it shows why and how 
goods trade can be a perfect substitute for factor movements. But the real world has 
not achieved yet the degree of economic integration that this model implies. One 
does not need sophisticated econometrics to conclude that wages vary substantially 
around the world. It is less obvious but probably true as well that rental rates also 
vary substantially around the world. These differences in factor prices indicate that 
regional differences in factor endowments and/or industry productivities are so large 
that goods trade cannot make up for factor immobility. 
 
                                                  
34 As a general proposition, it is not necessary that trade leads to the stability of the world income 
distribution. In fact, the study of the stability of world income distribution has received considerable 
attention recently. While Acemoglu and Ventura [2002] rely on specialization to generate a stable world 
income distribution, Deardorff [2001] presents a model in which mere differences in initial endowments 
create persistent difference in world income and “club convergence”. Krugman [1987] and Howitt [2000] 
rely on endogenous technology change to generate such effects. See Brezis, Krugman, and Tsiddon 
[1993] for a model of human capital accumulation that explains leapfrogging in the international income 
distribution. 
35 One implication of this is that Barro’s conditional convergence finding cannot be used to determine 
whether diminishing returns are weak or strong relative to market size effects. See Ventura [1997]. 
 40What trade always does is to create a global market in which only the most 
competitive producers of the world can survive. Trade forces high-cost industries to 
close down and offers low-cost industries the opportunity to grow. If dt∈FPEt, all 
regions contain enough of these low-cost industries to employ all of their factors at 
common or equalized factor prices. But this need not be always the case. If dt∉FPEt, 
regions with low industry productivities and sizeable factor endowments are forced to 
offer cheap factors to compete, while regions with high industry productivities and 
small factor endowments are able to enjoy expensive factors. These price 
differences indicate that factors are not deployed where they should and the world 
economy does not operate efficiently. To study the origins and effects of these world 
inefficiencies, it is necessary first to review some formal aspects of the model after 
globalization. 
 
2.3 Formal aspects of the model 
 
As mentioned already, in the absence of asset trade analogues of Equations 
(1) and (2) apply now to each region of the world economy. A regional analogue to 
Equation (3) also applies since it is a direct implication of our Cobb-Douglas 
assumption for the consumption and investment composites. Since all regions share 
spending patterns and face the same goods prices, the price of consumption and 
investment is the same for all. We keep this common price as the numeraire and, as 
a result, Equation (4) also applies. Equations (5)-(6) describing technology apply to 
all regions, with the corresponding factor prices and industry productivities.  
 
After globalization, Equations (7)-(10) describing pricing policies, input 
demands and the free-entry condition apply only to those regions that host the 
lowest-cost producers of the world. The rest cannot compete in global markets. To 
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An industry belongs to Ic,t if and only if producers located in region c are capable of 
competing internationally in this industry at date t.
36 Note that a region can be 
competitive in a given industry because it offers high productivity or a cheap 
combination of factor prices. The main implication of goods trade is that industries do 
not locate in regions where they are not competitive: 
 
(44)       if i∉I 0 Q it , c = c,t  for all i∈I and c∈C 
 
Since goods markets are integrated, Equation (11) describing market clearing 
in global goods markets still applies. But now Equations (12)-(13) describing market 
clearing in global factor markets must be replaced by analogue conditions imposing 
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Equations (45)-(46) state that the regional supplies of labor and capital must 
equal their regional demands. The latter are the sum of their industry demands, and 
these are calculated by applying Shephard’s lemma to Equations (5) and (6). 
 
                                                  
36 This follows directly from the cost functions in Equations (5)-(6) and the observation that all producers 
in the world face the same world demand. 
 42This completes the formal description of the model. For any admissible set of 
capital stocks, i.e. Kc,0 for all c∈C, and sequences for the vectors of savings, human 
capital and industry productivities, i.e. Sc,t, Hc,t, and Ac,it for all c∈C and for all i∈I, an 
equilibrium of the world economy after globalization consists of sequences of prices 
and quantities such that the equations listed above hold at all dates and states of 
nature. Although there might be multiple geographical patterns of production and 
trade that are consistent with world equilibrium, the assumptions made ensure that 
prices and world aggregates are uniquely determined.
37 
 
  We are ready now to re-examine the effects of globalization on factor prices 
and the world income distribution. We have already found that, if dt∈FPEt, 
globalization eliminates all regional differences in factor prices and permits the world 
economy to operate at the same level of efficiency as the integrated economy. In this 
case, global market forces are strong enough to ensure that diminishing returns and 
market size effects have a global rather than a regional scope. This is no longer the 
case if dt
                                                
∉FPEt since globalization cannot eliminate all regional differences in factor 
prices. These factor price differences reflect inefficiencies of various sorts in the 
world economy. 
 
Efficiency requires that factor usage within an industry be the same across 
regions. This is a direct implication of assuming diminishing returns to each factor in 
production. The problem, of course, is that regional factor proportions vary. 
Structural transformation allows regions to accommodate all or part of their 
differences in factor proportions without factor deepening. If there are enough 
industries that use different factor proportions, factor prices are equalized across 
regions. If there are not enough industries that use different factor proportions, 
regions must lower the price of their abundant factor and raise the price of their 
 
37 Despite the indeterminacy in trade patterns, the trade theorist will immediately recognize that, if βi=1 
for all i∈I, the volume of trade is determined and the popular gravity equation applies to this world 
economy. 
 43scarce one to attract enough firms to employ their factor endowments. In this case, 
industries in different regions use different factor proportions and the world economy 
is inefficient. Subsection 2.4 studies the properties of the growth process in this 
situation. 
 
  Efficiency also requires that industries locate in those regions that offer them 
the highest possible productivity. Structural transformation allows regions to 
accommodate all or part of their differences in industry productivities without 
productivity deepening. If all regions have enough industries with the highest 
productivity, factor prices are equalized across regions. If some regions do not have 
enough industries with the highest productivity, they are forced to produce in low 
productivity industries and must lower their factor prices to be able to compete 
internationally. Subsection 2.5 shows how this affects the properties of the growth 
process. 
 
In the presence of these two types of inefficiency, diminishing returns retain a 
regional scope even after globalization. Regional differences in factor prices still 
reflect regional differences in factor abundance and industry productivities, although 
the mapping between these variables is much more subtle than in the world of 
autarky. However, even in the presence of these inefficiencies regional differences in 
factor prices cannot reflect regional differences in market size. For market size 
effects to retain a regional scope after globalization we need to introduce 
impediments to goods trade. And this task is left for section 3.
 
 
2.4 Limits to structural transformation (I): factor proportions 
 
  It follows from Definition (36) that factor prices are equalized if and only if it is 
possible to achieve full employment of human and physical capital in all regions 
producing only with the highest productivity (requirement R1), with the factor 
proportions used in the integrated economy (requirement R2), and without incurring 
 44a fixed cost more than once (requirement R3). Moving away from the factor-price-
equalization world means that we must consider the violation of one or more of these 
requirements. Since the market for each input is “small”, I assume that regions are 
large enough to ensure that requirement R3 is always satisfied.
38 Therefore, in the 
remainder of this section I will focus on violations of requirements R1 and R2. In this 
subsection, we study the effects on the growth process of violations to requirement 
R2, keeping the assumption that requirement R1 is not binding. This assumption will 
be removed in sub-section 2.5. 
 
To formalize the notion that requirement R1 is not binding, define   as the 














 for all c∈C. To ensure that requirement R1 is not 
binding in the models of this section, for each of them I first construct the set of 
“unrestricted” world equilibria by assuming that   for all c∈C. As mentioned, all 
these equilibria share the same prices and world aggregates, but might exhibit 
different geographical patterns of production. In these “unrestricted” world equilibria, 
some industries might not operate in all regions. Naturally, prices and world 
aggregates would not be affected if regions did not have the best possible 
technologies in some or all of the industries in which they do not produce. Therefore, 
we can trivially relax the assumption that   contains all industries, and instead 
assume only that there exists an “unrestricted” equilibrium such that, for all c∈C, the 
industries not included in   do not operate in the region. This defines the extent to 
which regional differences in industry productivities are allowed in this section. It 
follows that requirement R1 is never binding and comparative advantage is 
determined solely by regional differences in factor proportions. 





                                                  
38 I shall explore the effects of violations to requirement R3 in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
 45In the worlds we consider in this sub-section it is not possible in general to 
employ all factors in all regions using the techniques of the integrated economy. 
Even if they concentrate all of their production in industries that use human capital 
intensively, regions with abundant human capital might lack enough physical capital 
to produce with the factor proportions that these industries would use in the 
integrated economy. These regions are therefore forced to use a higher proportion of 
human capital in their industries and this requires them to have a lower wage-rental 
ratio than in the integrated economy. Naturally, the exact opposite occurs in regions 
with abundant physical capital. This situation can be aptly described as a 
geographical mismatch between different factor endowments. 
 
To study the causes and effects of this mismatch, I present two examples that 
help build intuitions that apply more generally. The first example is the two-industry 
case that is so popular in trade theory: 
 
 





K=∅. Assume αi=αH, σi=σH and  { } Ht it , c
c
Z Z max =
∈C
 if i∈I
H, αi=αK, σi=σK and 
{ } Kt it , c
c
Z Z max =
∈C
 if i∈I
K, with αH≤αK. (Note that I
H⋅σH+I
K⋅σK=1) For simplicity, assume 



























 for  all  i∈I 











I C c i
it , c t
i
Q Y 
                                                  
39 These Equations follow from Equations (3) and (4). 
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Equation (47) can be thought of as the “demand” side of the model, since it 
shows how prices depend negatively on quantities, while Equation (48) simply 
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 for all i∈I. Equations (49)-(50) are factor market clearing 
conditions, while Equations (51)-(52) are just a transformation of the pricing 
equations of each industry (for both final goods and intermediate inputs). Naturally, 
these pricing equations hold with strict equality if there is positive production in the 
corresponding industry. Equations (49)-(52) determine the production of each type of 
industry and the factor prices of region c, as a function of world prices and income.
41 
                                                  
40 Equations (49)-(50) follow from Equations (45) and (46), while Equations (51)-(52) follow from 
Equations (7) and (9) after using Equation (17) to eliminate the number of input varieties. 
41 If one is willing to take goods prices and factor endowments parametrically and further assume that 
the pricing equations hold with strict equality, it is possible to derive two popular results of trade theory 
from Equations (49)-(52). The Stolper-Samuelson effect says that an increase in the relative price of an 
industry leads to a more than proportional increase in the price of the factor that is used intensively in 
this industry and a decline in the price of the other factor. The Rybcynski effect says that an increase in 
a factor endowment leads to a more than proportional increase in the production of the industry that 
uses this factor intensively and a decline in the production of the other industry. 
 47 
Equations (47)-(52) determine prices and quantities as a function of the 
distribution of factor endowments. Together with the regional analogues to Equation 
(1), the initial condition and the dynamics of the exogenous state variables, these 
Equations provide a complete characterization of the world equilibrium. Next, I 
describe some its most salient features. 
 
Regions with extreme factor proportions have specialized production 
structures, while regions with intermediate factor proportions have diversified 
production structures. Let CKt (CHt) be the set of regions where there is production 
only in K-industries (H-industries), and let CMt be the set of regions where there is 
production in both types of industries. In fact, it follows from Equations (49)-(52) that 
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It follows from Equations (51)-(52) that factor prices are the same for all c∈CM. 
If the dispersion in regional factor proportions is not too large, and the dispersion in 
factor intensities is not too low, CKt=CHt=∅ and there is factor price equalization. 
Otherwise, this world economy exhibits a limited version of the factor price 
equalization result since factor prices are still equalized for all c∈CMt. It is common in 
 48trade theory to refer to a group of regions that share the same factor prices as a 
“cone of diversification”. In fact, we can write the wage and the rental as a function of 
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  The wage is continuous and weakly declining on the human to physical 
capital ratio, while the rental is also continuous but increasing on this same ratio. 
The most noteworthy feature of these relationships is that they exhibit a “flat” for the 
set of human to physical capital ratios that define the cone of diversification. The top 
panel of Figure 10 shows how the wage-rental varies with a region’s ratio of human 
to physical capital. Regional differences in this ratio reflect factor abundance in the 
usual way. In regions with a high (low) ratio of human to physical capital the price of 
human capital is low (high) relative to physical capital. Factor prices do not reflect 
however regional differences in industry productivities and/or market size.  
 
It is now straightforward to compute the world income distribution as a 
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We can use Equation (58) to re-evaluate earlier results about the relative 
contribution of factor endowments and industry productivities to income differences 
across regions. The first result is that the elasticity of substitution between human 
and physical capital is one outside the cone of diversification, but infinity within the 
cone. This elasticity reflects the relative importance of structural transformation and 
factor deepening as means to absorb regional differences in factor proportions. The 
second result is that regional differences in industry productivities continue not 
playing a role in determining regional income differences. This, of course, is not 
surprising given the assumption we have made about requirement R1 not being 
binding. The third and final result is that relative incomes are homogenous of degree 
one on factor endowments. This not surprising either since it simply confirms the 
absence of market size effects at the regional level. 
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  The specific dynamics of this example are hard to determine, since fHt and fKt 
change from generation to generation. It is easy to construct examples in which the 
world economy moves towards factor-price equalization; examples in which the 
world economy moves away from factor-price equalization; or examples in which the 
world economy alternates between periods in which factor prices are equalized and 
periods in which they are not. These dynamics depend on all the parameters the 
 50model (including initial condition) and the evolution of the exogenous state variables, 
i.e. savings, human capital and industry productivities.  Regardless of the specific 
dynamics, the world income distribution is stable if the joint distribution of these 
variables is stationary. Economic growth is positively transmitted across regions 
through changes in goods prices. This stabilizing role of trade is further reinforced by 
the fact that regions outside the cones cannot absorb capital accumulation through 




Identifying cones of diversification is important because regional differences 
in factor proportions lead to structural transformation inside them, but to factor 
deepening outside them. In example 2.4.1, there is one of such cones and contains 
regions with intermediate factor proportions. Regions with extreme factor proportions 
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simplicity, assume also that εi=ε and βi=β for all i∈I. The “demand” side of this model 
is still described by Equations (47)-(48), but the “supply side is now given by: 
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  Unlike the previous example, we find now that regions with extreme factor 
proportions have diversified production structures, while regions with intermediate 
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Regions in CKt (CHt) produce in the M-industries and the K-industries (H-industries), 
while regions in CMt
                                                




42 Note that the sets CKt and CHt never intersect in world equilibrium. Assume the opposite, then it 
follows that equilibrium input prices must satisfy fMt<(fHt)
1-αM⋅(fKt)
αM. But if this inequality held nobody 
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Once again, the wage is continuous and weakly declining on the human to 
physical capital ratio, while the rental is also continuous but increasing on this same 
ratio. But now these relationships exhibit at most two “flats”, one for each set of 
human to physical capital ratios that defines a cone of diversification. Regional 
differences in factor prices reflect again factor abundance in the usual way. This 
world economy contains at most two cones of diversification.
43 Regions with extreme 
factor proportions belong to one of them, while regions with intermediate factor 
proportions do not. The middle panel of Figure 10 shows how the wage-rental varies 
with a region’s ratio of human to physical capital. 
 
It is straightforward to compute the analogues of Equation (58)-(59) for this 
example and check that the mapping from factor endowments to incomes and 
capital accumulation is also linear within the cones and takes the Cobb-Douglas 
form outside of them. The picture of the growth process that comes out of this 
example is therefore very similar to the on in Example 2.4.1. 
 
 
                                                  
43 I say “at most” because it is also possible that  Mt Mt R = R , in which the case there would be a single 
cone. Cuñat and Mafezzoli [2004a] analyze a similar model under the assumption that none of the 
regions of the world have specialized production structures, i.e. CMt=∅. 
 53  Examples 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 can be generalized by introducing further industries 
with different factor intensities. As we do so, the potential number of cones 
increases. But the overall picture remains the same. The world economy sorts itself 
out in a series of cones of diversification. The bottom panel of Figure 10 depicts a 
case with multiple cones of diversification.
44 Small regional differences in factor 
proportions lead to structural transformation within cones, but to factor deepening 
outside them. Large regional differences in factor proportions might span one or 
more cones and therefore lead to a mix of structural transformation and factor 
deepening. Therefore, the world of diversification cones can be seen as being 




  In the light of these results, we must slightly revise our earlier discussion of 
the effects of globalization on the source of income differences. As in the world of 
factor-price equalization, differences in domestic productivities cannot be a source of 
income differences and relative incomes are homogeneous of degree one with 
respect to factor endowments. But unlike the world of factor-price-equalization, the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic factors is no longer infinity but instead lies 
somewhere between one (outside cones) and infinity (within cones). As mentioned, 
this elasticity measures the relative importance of structural transformation and 
factor deepening as a means to accommodate regional differences in factor 
proportions. And this relative importance in turn depends on various factors, most 
notably how dispersed are factor intensities across industries. Two extreme 
examples make this point forcefully. If the dispersion in industry factor intensities is 
extreme, i.e. αi∈{0,1} for all i∈I, then regional differences in factor proportions 
always lead to structural transformation and the world income distribution is given by 
                                                  
44 Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson [1980] develop a similar model with a continuum of goods that 
vary in their factor intensity, although they do not specifically study the formation of cones. 
45 In pure Heckscher-Ohlin models, Deardorff [2001] and Cuñat and Maffezzoli [2004a] generate “club 
convergence”. Stiglitz [1970] and Devereux and Shi [1991] are examples where cones of diversification 
establish due to inherently different time-preferences and incomes diverge. Oniki and Uzawa [1965] 
analyze conditions for diversification cones in two-sector model. 
 54Equations (39)-(40).
46 If the dispersion in industry factor intensities is instead 
negligible, i.e. αi=α for all i∈I, then regional differences in factor proportions always 
lead to factor deepening and the world income distribution is given by:
47 
 
(70)   
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As in the world of autarky, the elasticity of substitution across factors is one (see 
Equation (33)). But unlike the world of autarky, regional differences in industry 
productivities and market size play no role in explaining regional income differences. 
 
We do not need to revise however our earlier discussion of how globalization 
affects the dynamic responses to region-specific shocks. In this respect, the world 
with diversification cones offers the same insights as the world of factor-price-
equalization. Region-specific shocks to savings and human capital have positive 
effects that spill over to other regions, while shocks to industry productivities only 
have effects if they push outwards the world productivity frontier. Economic growth is 
positively transmitted across regions through changes in goods prices and this 
keeps the world income distribution stable. In fact, this force towards stability is 
further reinforced in regions that are outside a cone by the existence of diminishing 
returns in production. 
 
  We conclude therefore that violations to requirement R2 do not alter much the 
picture came out of the factor-price-equalization world. Surely the geographical 
mismatch between different factor endowments implied by these violations might 
generate large inefficiencies that, in turn, might lead to sizeable regional differences 
in factor prices. Therefore, there might be important quantitative differences between 
a world with many diversification cones and the world of factor-price-equalization. 
But the qualitative properties of the growth process of these two worlds remain 
relatively close to each other, and far away from those of the world of autarky. 
                                                  
46 This is the model used by Ventura [1997]. 
47 One of many ways to find this result is as the appropriate limiting case of Examples 2.4.1 or 2.4.2. 
 55 
2.5 Limits to structural transformation (II): industry productivities 
 
Consider next worlds where requirement R1 is either binding or fails. Regions 
with few high-productivity industries might find that even if they concentrate all of 
their production in those industries, they cannot employ all of their factors and 
produce the same quantities as the integrated economy. These regions are therefore 
forced to exceed the production of the integrated economy in those industries and/or 
move into low-productivity industries. Whatever the case, this requires these regions 
to offer low factor prices to employ all of their factors. This situation can be aptly 
described as a geographical mismatch between industry productivities and factor 
endowments. 
 
To make further progress, it is necessary to be more explicit about why and 
how industry productivities differ across regions. The first example considers the 
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α − ⋅ π =
c,Ht and πc,Kt are 
interpreted as labor- and capital-augmenting productivity differences, The world 
productivity frontier is given by  . In the integrated economy, 






t is “small” and, except for a few very special or knife-edge cases, factor-price 
equalization is not possible and requirement R1 fails.
 48 
                                                  
48 Take, for instance, the case of two regions and two industries. If one region has the highest 
productivity in both industries the only factor distribution that leads to factor-price equalization is the one 
 56 
To understand the logic of this world, it is useful to follow the usual procedure 
of re-normalizing the model in terms of “efficiency” or “productivity-equivalent” factor 
units. That is, we can pretend that regional factor endowments are given by 
 and K  for all c∈C; and that industry productivities are 
identical across regions, i.e.   for all i∈I and all c
t , c Ht , c t , c H H ˆ ⋅ π = t , c Kt , c t , c K ˆ ⋅ π =
1 Z ˆ
it , c = ∈C. Then, productivity-












= r ˆ . The key observation 
is that the re-normalized model is formally equivalent to the model of the previous 
section.
49 Therefore, all the results we obtained in the previous sections regarding 
the cross-section of factor prices also apply here to productivity-adjusted factor 




As the worlds of the previous section, this world economy sorts itself out in a 
series of cones of diversification. All regions within a cone have the same 
productivity-adjusted factor prices, although possibly different factor prices as usually 
measured. Regional differences in productivity-adjusted factor proportions lead to 
structural transformation within cones, and to factor deepening across them. When 
all regions are located within a single cone, we have the conditional factor-price-
equalization result emphasized by Trefler [1993]. That is, regional differences in 
factor prices reflect only differences in factor-augmenting productivities and are not 
related to differences in productivity-adjusted factor proportions. 
                                                                                                                                          
in which all factors are located in this region. If instead each region has the highest productivity in a 
different industry, the only factor distribution that leads to factor-price equalization is the one in which 
each region receives the exact quantity of factors that its high-productivity industry uses in the 
integrated economy. 
49 The re-normalized model is a bit less general than the model of the previous section since it does not 
display regional differences in industry productivities. We could (trivially) generalize this example to 
allow for regional differences in industry productivities, but keeping the assumption that requirement R1 
is not binding in the re-normalized model. 
50 For instance, Equations (56)-(57) describe the productivity-adjusted factor if we further assume that 
the world economy contains two types of industries as in Example 2.4.1. Similarly, Equations (68)-(69) 
describe productivity-adjusted factor prices if we instead assume that the world economy contains three 
types of industries as in Example 2.4.2. 
 57 
Although the presence of factor-augmenting productivity differences does not 
alter much the formal or mathematical structure of the model, it has important 
implications for the question of why some regions are richer than others. Unlike the 
worlds of section 2.4, we now have that productivity differences become a source of 
income differences across countries. For instance, if all regions belong to a single 
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Alternatively, if all the industries in the world have the same factor intensity we have 
the following counterpart of Equation (70): 
 
(72) 
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where  .
α α − π ⋅ π ⋅ = Kt , c
1
Ht , c t t , c A ˆ A
51 The inability of the world economy to match best 
technologies with appropriate factors moves us a step closer to the world of autarky, 
since regional productivities now affect regional incomes. Moreover, since now the 
world operates below its productivity frontier shocks to regional factor productivities 
have effects even if they do not push this frontier. Note however that, as in the 
worlds of section 2.4, the elasticity of substitution between domestic factors still lies 
somewhere between one (outside cones) and infinity (within cones); and relative 
incomes are homogeneous of degree one with factor endowments.  
 
The rest of the picture of the growth process that comes out of this world 
remains close to the world of factor-price-equalization. Region-specific shocks to 
savings and human capital have positive effects that spill over to other regions. 
Economic growth is positively transmitted across regions through goods prices and 
                                                  
51 This model therefore provides an alternative theoretical foundation for the work of Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil [1992], Hall and Jones [1999] and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare [1997]. 
 58this keeps the world income distribution stable. If the conditional version of the 
factor-price-equalization theorem does not hold, regions outside the cones 
experience diminishing returns and this reinforces the effects of changes in product 
prices on the stability of the world income distribution. 
 
 
Assuming that regional productivity differences take the factor-augmenting 
form discussed in example 2.5.1 is popular because it yields tractable models. But 
the factor-augmenting view of productivity differences hides some interesting effects 
of trade on the world income distribution and its stability. One reason is that, in the 
world of factor-augmenting productivity differences, comparative advantage is still 
determined solely by regional differences in factor proportions, albeit productivity-
adjusted ones. The next example provides a dramatic illustration of how regional 
differences in industry productivities could determine comparative advantage, and 
how this brings about a new effect of trade on the world income distribution: 
 
 
Example 2.5.2: Consider a world with many industries and regions. Assume 
that   if i , and  1 Z it , c =
*
c,t I ∈ 0 Z it , c =  if i ; where   for all c∈C constitutes a 









*  and    for all c∈C and c’∈C. Assume also that 
  for all c∈C. That is, each region knows how to produce a disjoint subset of 
goods. Since only one region knows how to produce each good, the corresponding 












c,t =I ∈C, regardless of the factor 
distribution. In this world, comparative advantage is driven solely by regional 
differences in industry productivities, and differences in factor proportions play no 
role. In this example, requirement R1 does not fail but it is binding, except for a few 
very special and knife-edge cases. 
 
 59A bit of straightforward algebra shows that production and factor allocations 
are given as follows: 
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 for all i∈I. 
Equation (73) describes the world income distribution as a function of factor 
allocations and goods prices, while Equations (74)-(75) provide the equilibrium factor 
allocations as a function of aggregate factor endowments. By substituting Equations 
(74)-(75) into Equation (73), we obtain the world income distribution as a function of 
factor endowments and input prices.
52 It is immediate to show that the elasticity of 
substitution between human and physical capital is between one and infinity; that 
regional differences in industry productivities affect regional differences in income; 
and that the world income distribution is homogeneous of degree one with respect to 
factor endowments. 
 
These results are obtained from a relationship between incomes, factor 
endowments and industry productivities that holds constant input prices. Once we 
substitute input prices into this relationship, we find that the world income distribution 












   for  all  c∈C 
                                                  
52 This relationship is formally analogous, for instance, to Equation (58) in Example 2.4.1. 
 60 
Equation (76) states that the share of world income of each region equals that 
share of world spending on the industries located in the region, and it does not 
depend on domestic factor endowments. What is going on? Assume a region has a 
ratio of human to physical capital λ times higher than average. Since the region is 
producing a fixed set of goods, it is forced to operate with a ratio that is λ times 
higher than average, and this requires a wage-rental ratio that is λ
-1 higher than 
average. Therefore the elasticity of substitution between human and physical capital 
in production is one. What is different here is that relative incomes are now 
homogeneous of degree zero with respect to factor endowments. Assume a region’s 
human and physical capitals are both λ times average. Since production is 
homogenous of degree one with factor endowments, its production of all industries is 
λ times average. But since the country faces a demand for its products with price-
elasticity equal to one, the prices of its products are λ
-1 times average. As a result, 
the income of the region is just average, despite its factor endowments being λ times 
average. 
 
So what should we conclude about the degree of homogeneity of relative 
incomes with respect to factor endowments? As Equations (73)-(75) and (76) show, 
in empirical applications it will depend on whether we are holding goods prices 
constant or not. If we are holding these prices constant, then relative incomes are 
homogeneous of degree one in factor endowments. If we are not holding goods 
prices constant, then the degree of homogeneity of relative incomes with respect of 
factor endowments lies between zero and one. In this example, this degree of 
homogeneity is zero because regional differences in factor endowments are 
absorbed by regional variation in the quantities produced of each input. In Examples 
2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.5.1, this degree of homogeneity was one because regional 
differences in factor endowments were absorbed by regional variation in the number 
of input varieties produced. The next example, inspired by Dornbusch, Fischer and 
Samuelson [1977], neatly clarifies this point by showing an intermediate world where 
both margins are at work. 
 61 
 
Example 2.5.3: Consider a world with two regions, C={N,S}; and a continuum 
of industries, I=[0,1]. Assume all industries have the same factor intensity, αi=α for 
all i∈I. For simplicity, let also εi=ε and βi=β for all i∈I.  It follows immediately that: 
53 
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c,t is a measure of factor costs of region c, i.e. 
 for all c∈C. To characterize the world income distribution in this world, 
we need to determine factor costs. Equation (77) is akin to Equation (58) or 
Equations (73)-(75) in the sense that it shows the world income distribution as a 
function of factor endowments and input prices. Not surprisingly, these relative 
incomes are homogeneous of degree one with respect to factor endowments. The 
next step is to determine input prices and substitute them into Equation (77). 







T ≡  for all i∈I as the industry productivity of North relative to 
South. Then, assign indices or order goods so that Ti is non-increasing in i. Note that 
Ti might be neither continuous nor invertible.
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i I I S,t . That is, North (or N) specializes 
on low-index industries while South (or S) specializes in high-index industries. The 
cutoff industry, i*, is determined as follows:
55 
 
                                                  
53 This follows directly from the observation that the share of human and physical capital in income are 
1-α and α, respectively. 
54 This ranking can vary over time, but this does not play any role here. Without loss of generality, the 
reader can focus on the case in which the ranking is time-invariant. 
55 If Ti is not invertible in the region of interest, this condition determines a set of candidate values for i*. 
 62(78)  * i
t , S





 Let  Xi be world share of spending on all industries with indices equal or lower 
than i, that is,  . Note that X ∫ ⋅ σ ≡
i
0
j i dj X i is non-decreasing in i, and takes values zero 
and one for i=0 and i=1. It follows from this definition that YN,t=Xi*⋅(YN,t+YS,t) and, 










































  Equations (78)-(79) jointly determine the pattern of production and trade (i*) 
and relative factor costs (fN,t/fS,t) as a function of spending patterns, industry 
productivities and factor endowments. Finally, we can use the numeraire rule in 
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Having already found the pattern of production and trade (i*) and relative factor costs 
(fN,t/fS,t), Equation (80) can then be used to determine absolute factor costs. 
 
  This world is somewhat different form the ones we have seen so far in that we 
have only two regions. To think about the effects of factor endowments on relative 
incomes, I consider next a situation in which both regions have symmetric 
technologies and differ in that North’s factor endowments are λ (>1) times larger 
than South’s.
56 Figure 11 depicts this world. The AA and BB lines represent 
                                                  
56 By symmetric technologies, I mean that if there exists an industry i such that Ti=τ then there also 
exists another industry i’ such that Ti’=1/τ and αi=αi’, βi=βi’, εi=εi’ and σi=σi’. 
 63Equations (78) and (79), respectively.  The AA line is non-increasing because Ti is 
non-increasing in i, while the BB line is non-decreasing because Xi is non-decreasing 
in i. The existence of a unique crossing point follows since the BB line takes value 
zero at i=0 and slopes upward towards infinity at i=1. 
 
  The top panel of Figure 11 shows the case in which Ti is flat. This case 
corresponds to a world in which differences in industry productivities are minimal or 
irrelevant at the margin as in Examples 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.5.1. This allows North to 
employ its larger factor endowments by producing a larger number of varieties than 
South. Factor costs are the same in both regions and, as a result, North’s income is 
λ times South’s. Relative incomes (after substituting in goods prices) are 
homogenous of degree one on factor endowments. 
 
The middle panel of Figure 11 shows the opposite case in which Ti is vertical. 
This case corresponds to a world in which differences in industry productivities are 
extreme as in Examples 2.5.2. North is forced to employ its larger factor 
endowments by producing a higher quantity of each of its varieties. Factor costs in 
North are λ
-1 times those of South and, as a result, North’s income equals that of 
South. Relative incomes (after substituting in goods prices) are homogenous of 
degree zero on factor endowments. 
 
The bottom panel shows the intermediate case in which Ti is neither flat nor 
vertical. Since the slope reflects how strong are differences in industry productivities, 
we are somewhere in between the two extreme examples considered up to now. 
North employs its larger factor endowments by producing a larger number of 
varieties and also a larger quantity of each of them. Factor costs in North are 
somewhere between λ
-1 and one times those of South. The degree of homogeneity 
of relative incomes (after substituting in goods prices) on factor endowments is 
therefore somewhere between zero and one. 
 
 64  It is possible to generalize Example 2.5.3 in a variety of directions. For 
instance, one could allow for industry variation in factor intensities and many 
regions.
57 This is important in empirical applications, of course. But the central 
message remains. The effects of factor endowments on relative incomes depend on 
regional differences in industry productivities. If these differences are small, regions 
with larger factor endowments absorb them mostly through structural transformation: 
not changing much their production in existing industries and moving into new 
industries where the region’s productivity relative to the rest of the world is similar to 
existing ones. If differences in industry productivities are large, regions with larger 
factor endowments absorb them by productivity deepening: substantially increasing 
their production in existing industries and/or moving into industries where the 
region’s productivity relative to the rest of the world is substantially lower than in 
existing ones. 
 
  One can conclude from this discussion that differences in industry 
productivities create another force for diminishing returns to physical capital 
accumulation. As physical capital is accumulated, quantities produced increase and 
the terms of trade worsen. The result is a reduction in factor prices that lowers 
wages, savings and capital accumulation. This is a central aspect of the growth 
process in a world of interdependent regions generates a force towards the stability 




  I argued at the end of section 1 that, if globalization leads to the integrated 
economy, there is a powerful prescription for economic development: open up and 
integrate into the world economy. This allows regions to benefit from higher 
productivity, improved factor allocation and increased market size. Not much has 
changed here. Naturally, if factor prices are equalized the effects are literally the 
same as in section 1 since the globalization leads to the integrated economy. If 
                                                  
57 See Wilson [1980], Eaton and Kortum [1999, 2000], Matsuyama [2000] and Alvarez and Lucas 
[2004]. 
58 See Acemoglu and Ventura [2002] on this point. 
 65factor prices are not equalized, the world economy operates with a lower productivity 
and a worse factor allocation than the integrated economy. This also means that the 
size of the world economy will be smaller than that of the integrated economy. As a 
result, all the benefits from globalization are smaller in the worlds of sub-sections 2.4 
and 2.5 than in the world of factor-price equalization. But it is still relatively 
straightforward to see that coupled with an appropriate transfer scheme globalization 
constitutes a Pareto improvement for the world economy. Moreover, since all regions 
gain from trade there exist Pareto-improving transfer schemes that do not require 
inter-regional transfers.
59 Therefore, the prescription for development remains the 
same: open up and integrate into the world economy. 
 
We have traveled much already, and the global view of economic growth is 
starting to take shape. This view is more realistic and rich in details than the views 
that came out from either the world of autarky or the integrated economy. Despite 
this progress, we should not rest here yet. We have assumed so far that 
globalization eliminates all impediments to goods trade. This is obviously an 
unrealistic assumption. Is it also a crucial one? 
 
 
3. Transport costs and market size 
 
Despite the already large and growing importance of international trade, there 
are some important areas of economic activity where the degree of market 
integration is still relatively low. Surely the clearest case in point is the service 
sector.
60 As the textbook example of a haircut suggests, many services are 
                                                  
59 How do we know that all regions have non-negative gains from globalization? Since regions have the 
choice of not trading, it is therefore possible to achieve the level of income and welfare of the world of 
autarky after globalization. Realizing these gains might require implementing an appropriate tax-subsidy 
scheme, though. 
60 In industrial economies, the service sector accounts for more than two thirds of production but only 
for about one fifth of exports and imports. Moreover, most trade in services is concentrated in activities 
related to transportation and travel even though these activities only constitute a small component of 
overall services production. 
 66inherently more difficult to transport than agricultural and manufacturing products. 
Services also tend to be more vulnerable to various governmental barriers to trade, 
such as professional licensing requirements that discriminate against foreigners, 
domestic content requirements in public procurement, or poor protection of 
intellectual property rights.
61 In addition, there are important examples of weak 
market integration that go beyond the service sector. Trade in some agricultural and 
manufacturing products is also severely restricted as a result of protectionist 
practices in industrial countries. 
 
The goal of this section is to study the effects on the growth process of partial 
segmentation in goods markets. The new model of globalization that I shall adopt 
here is as follows: at date t=0 the costs of transporting some (but not all) goods 
across regions suddenly fall from prohibitive to negligible. In particular, I partition the 
set of all industries into the sets of tradable and nontradable industries, i.e. Tt and Nt 
such that Tt∪Nt =I and Tt∩Nt =∅. The costs of transporting intermediate inputs and 
final goods fall from prohibitive to negligible at t=0 if i∈Tt. But even after t=0, the 
costs of transporting either the intermediate inputs, or the final goods, or both remain 
prohibitive if i∈Nt.
62 We keep assuming that the costs of transporting factors across 
regions remain prohibitive after t=0, and that international trade in assets is not 
possible. Naturally, the model analyzed in section 2 (and formally described in 
section 2.3) obtains as the special case of this model in which Tt=I and Nt=∅





61 There are also signs that this is changing rapidly. Advances in telecommunications technology, the 
appearance of e-commerce and the development of new and standardized software have all opened up 
the possibility of trading a wider range of services. Recent multilateral trade negotiations and the 
process of European integration have also led to the dismantling of various non-tariff barriers to service 
trade. 
62 The most popular alternative to this model is the “iceberg” cost model whereby all goods are subject 
to the same proportional transport cost. In particular, a quantity τ (>1) of a good must be shipped from 
source to ensure that one unit of it arrives to destination. The rest “melts” away in transit. See 
Matsuyama [2004] for yet another model of transport costs. 
 67A central aspect of the analysis turns out to be whether transport costs apply 
only to final goods, to intermediate inputs, or to both. Section 3.1 presents the case 
in which transport costs apply only to final goods. This model neatly generalizes the 
results obtained in the previous section. Section 3.2 studies the case in which 
transport costs apply only to intermediate inputs. This gives rise to agglomeration 
effects that can have a large and somewhat unexpected impact on the world income 
distribution. Section 3.3 analyzes the case in which transport costs apply to both final 
goods and intermediate inputs. The interaction between the two types of frictions 
brings about a new perspective on the role of local markets. 
 
3.1 Nontraded goods and the cost of living 
 
Consider next a world where some final goods are not tradable, although the 
intermediate inputs required to produce them are always tradable. In particular, the 
costs of trading intermediate inputs are negligible for all i∈I; and the costs of 
transporting final goods are negligible if i∈Tt but prohibitive if i∈Nt. Since prices of 
final goods can differ across regions, a novel feature of this model is that regions will 
have different price levels. 
  
I must now revise the formal description of the model. While regional 
analogues of Equations (1) and (2) continue to apply, one must now recognize that 
final goods prices in nontradable industries might differ across regions. As a result, 
the price of consumption and investment will vary across them even if Equation (3) 
describing spending patterns still applies to all regions. Therefore, we must write the 
analogues of Equations (1) and (2) as follows: 
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Equation (83) replaces Equation (4). The latter obtains as the special case of the 
former in which all goods are tradable, i.e. Tt=I and Nt=∅. An implication of this 
choice of numeraire is that the price level of region c is equal to the ideal price index 




















P  for  all  c∈C 
 
Since now price levels differ across regions it is necessary to distinguish between 
two concepts of income and factor prices: (1) market-based incomes and factor 
prices, i.e. Yc,t, wc,t and rc,t; and (2) real or PPP-adjusted incomes and factor prices, 
i.e. Yc,t/Pc,t, wc,t/Pc,t and rc,t/Pc,t. Whenever there is no risk of confusion, I shall refer to 
the former simply as income and factor prices, and to the latter as real income and 
real factor prices. As before, Equations (5)-(6) describing technology apply to all 
regions, with the corresponding factor prices and industry productivities.  
 
After globalization, producers of intermediate inputs in all industries and 
producers of final goods in tradable industries face a global market and Equations 
 69(7)-(10) describing pricing policies, input demands and the free-entry condition 
therefore apply only to those regions where the lowest-cost producers are located. 
But even after globalization, producers of final goods in nontradable industries 
remain sheltered from foreign competition, and Equations (7)-(8) apply to all regions 
and not only to the lowest-cost ones. Thus, Equation (44) no longer applies to the 
producers of final goods in nontradable industries (Equation (43) still stands as a 
definition, though). 
 
Market clearing conditions are also affected by the presence of transport 
costs. While Equations (45)-(46) describing market clearing in regional factor 
markets still apply, Equation (11) describing market clearing in global markets for 
final goods applies only to tradable industries. In nontradable industries, Equation 
(11) must be replaced by analogue conditions imposing market clearing in each 
regional market: 
 
(85)     for  all  i∈N it , c it , c it , c E Q P = ⋅  t and c∈C 
 
This completes the formal description of the model. For any admissible set of 
capital stocks, i.e. Kc,0 for all c∈C; sequences for the vectors of savings, human 
capital and industry productivities, i.e. Sc,t, Hc,t, and Ac,it for all c∈C and for all i∈I; and 
a sequence for the set Nt (or Tt); an equilibrium of the world economy after 
globalization consists of a sequence of prices and quantities such that the equations 
listed above hold at all dates and states of nature. Although there might be multiple 
geographical patterns of production that are consistent with world equilibrium, the 
assumptions made ensure that prices and world aggregates are uniquely 
determined. 
 
The best way to start the analysis is by asking again whether the assumed 
trade restrictions matter at all. That is, to ask whether restricting factor mobility and 
 70now goods trade impede the world to achieve the level of efficiency of the integrated 
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Comparing Definitions (36) and (86), we observe that the latter contains an 
additional requirement: each region should be able to produce all the final goods 
used for its own consumption and investment in nontradable industries. This 
additional restriction is a direct consequence of transport costs. The presence of this 
additional restriction reduces the size of FPEt. In fact, it is now even possible that 
FPEt=∅. For instance, assume regional differences in industry productivities are 
such that there exists no region that has the highest possible productivity in all 





                                                
∈FPEt, factor prices are equalized across regions and the world economy 
operates with the same efficiency as the integrated economy despite factor 
immobility and goods market segmentation. In this case, the world economy 
 
63 That one or more regions with the highest possible productivity in all nontradable industries exist is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for FPEt≠∅. Since factor-price equalization requires that all factors 
be located in these regions, it is also necessary that at least one of these regions have the highest 
possible productivity for each tradable industry. 
 71behaves exactly as the world of factor-price equalization of section 2.2.
64 If dt∉FPEt, 
the world economy cannot operate at the same level efficiency as the integrated 
economy. As a result, either market-based factor prices, or real factor prices, or both 
differ across regions. But even in this case the behavior of the world economy does 
not depart much from what we observed in the worlds of section 2. To see this, 
define H and K  as the factor endowments devoted to the production of tradable 
goods, i.e. all intermediate inputs and the final goods of tradable industries. 
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Equations (87)-(88) show the factor supplies that are left after subtracting from 
aggregate factor supplies the factors used in the production of final goods in 
nontradable industries. In the special case in which N t =∅
                                                
, these factor supplies 
equal the aggregate factor supplies and are independent of factor prices. But in the 
general case, these factor supplies depend on factor prices in the usual way. The 
higher is the wage-rental, the lower is the human to physical capital ratio used for the 
production of final goods in nontradable industries and, as a result, the higher is the 
relative supply of human to physical capital that is left after production of final goods 
in nontradable industries. 
 
 
64 Even the price levels would be equalized across regions, i.e. Pc,t=1 for all c∈C. Note however that 
there is less indeterminacy regarding the patterns of production and trade, since nontradable final 
goods must now be produced in the same region where they are used for consumption or investment. 
65 To see this, note that the shares of human and physical capital devoted to producing the final good of 
the i
th nontradable industry are (1-βi)⋅(1-αi) and (1-βi)⋅αi. Add over industries and note that the share of 
spending in the i
th industry is σi⋅Yc,t. 
 72With Equations (87)-(88) at hand, it is straightforward to see that all the 
results in sections 2.4 and 2.5 regarding incomes and factor prices still go through in 
the presence of nontradable final goods. Take, for instance, Example 2.4.1. 
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t , c c,t 
and Kc,t, in Equations (49)-(50). Factor prices and the pattern of trade are determined 
by these modified versions of Equations (47)-(52) together with Equations (87)-(88). 
Since factor supplies are well behaved, a brief analysis of this system reveals that all 
the discussion of the properties of the world income distribution and its dynamics 
after Equations (58)-(59) still goes through. In fact, all the results and intuitions 
developed in the examples of sections 2.4 and 2.5 still apply after we remove the 
assumption that N t =∅. 
 
The major difference between the world of this sub-section and the one in 
section 2 is that there is a discrepancy between market-based and real incomes and 
factor prices. To see this, we need to compute regional price levels. Equations (5)-
(7) and (83) imply that: 
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  Since all regions face the same input prices, Equation (91) shows that, ceteris 
paribus, the price level is high in regions that have high factor prices and low 
productivity in nontradable industries. This relationship is the first piece of a theory of 
the price level. The second piece is a relationship between factor prices, factor 
endowments and industry productivities. The following examples show how to obtain 
this additional relationship. 
 
 





K=∅. Assume αi=αH and  { } Ht it , c
c
Z Z max =
∈C
 if i∈I
H, αi=αK and  { } Kt it , c
c




K, with αH≤αK. For simplicity, assume also that εi=ε and βi=β for all i∈I.  As in 
section 2.4, we assume that requirement R1 is not binding.
66 The only difference 
between this world and the one in Example 2.4.1 is the presence of nontradable 
industries, i.e. N t ≠∅.   
 
Let PHt and PKt be the prices of final goods in tradable H- and K-industries. If a 
region is internationally competitive in tradable H-industries, then the price of final 
goods of its nontradable H-industries is also PHt.
67 If a region is not competitive 
internationally, then the price of final goods in its nontradable H-industries exceeds 
PHt. In fact, it follows from Equations (5) and (51)-(52) that the price of the final goods 












. A parallel argument shows that the 












. It then 
follows from Equations (83)-(84) that the price level of region c is given by: 
                                                  
66 Note that this implies that all regions have the same productivity in nontradable industries. That is, 
Zc,it=ZHt if i∈N t∩
 I
H and Zc,it=ZKt if i∈N t∩I
K for all c∈C. 
67 This follows because the technology to produce final goods is the same for all H-industries, and also 
because the number of input varieties of H-industries does not depend on whether the industry is 
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P     for all c∈C 
 
   As in Example 2.4.1, regions with intermediate factor proportions have 
diversified production structures while regions with extreme factor proportions have 
specialized production structures. The sets CMt , CKt and CHt are still defined by 




t , c K c,t and Kc,t. It follows 
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P i f  c∈CKt∪CHt. All regions within the cone share the same 
price level, and this is the lowest in the world. The reason, of course, is that these 
regions are competitive both in H- and K-industries. Regions outside the cone have 
different price levels. Moreover, it is possible to show that these price levels increase 
the farther away the regions are from the cone. The reason is that the farther away 
from the cone, the less competitive a region is in one of the industry types and the 




  Example 3.1.1 provides us with a simple theory of why and how the price 
level varies across regions. But it is difficult to reconcile this theory with the data. The 
later show that price levels are positively correlated with income, so that regional 
differences in real incomes are substantially smaller than regional differences in 
market-based incomes. To obtain this pattern in the world of Example 3.1.1 would 
require that poor regions be located inside the cone and rich regions outside of it. 
Although this is not impossible from a theoretical standpoint, it does not seem a 
 75promising starting point for the construction of an empirically successful theory of the 
price level. 
 
A positive association between incomes and price levels could arise 
somewhat more naturally in the world of Example 2.4.2 once we remove the 
assumption that Nt =∅. For instance, if nontradable industries tend to be more 
human-capital intensive than tradable industries the price level would be high in 
regions that belong to CKt; intermediate in regions that belong to CMt; and low in 
regions that belong to CHt. Assume then that most of the variation in income levels is 
due to differences in savings rates, so that rich regions are those that have low 
human to physical capital ratios. This does not seem implausible, since most 
nontradable industries tend to be in the service sector and this sector tends to use a 
higher human to physical capital ratio than other sectors. 
 
More generally, in the worlds of sub-section 2.4 the correlation between 
income and price levels is positive or negative depending on how factor proportions 
vary with income and the factor intensities of nontradable industries relative to 
tradable ones. The central observation is that price levels should be high in regions 
that have factor proportions that are inadequate to produce nontradable goods. 
Building an empirically successful theory of the price level around this notion seems 
promising, although it remains to be done. Most of the existing research on the price 
level has focused instead on the role of regional differences in industry 
productivities. The next example presents a world where these differences generate 
a positive association between income and the price level. 
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Kt , c . The crucial feature 
 76of this example is that productivity differences exist only in tradable industries.
68 This 
world economy is akin to that in Example 2.5.1. For instance, assume that there are 
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where   for all i∈I. Since productivity differences in tradable 
industries are factor augmenting, regions with higher productivities have higher 
factor prices. Since there are no productivity differences in nontradable industries, 
regions with higher factor prices have a higher price level. Note that now a region 
inside the cone with high productivity in the tradable industries could have a higher 











In the world of this example, the price level is determined by a combination of 
two elements:  how adequate are the region’s factor proportions to produce in the 
nontradable industries; and how high is the region’s productivity in the tradable 
industries relative to the nontradable ones. In the world of Example 3.1.1, this 
second force was not present and Equation (93) was reduced to Equation (92). We 
could also eliminate the first force by assuming that all regions belong to the cone, 
i.e. by assuming that there is conditional factor-price equalization. In this case, the 
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68 This assumption makes sense because nontradable industries consist mostly of services, and in the 
real world productivity differences in services seem small relative to productivity differences in 
agriculture or manufacturing. 
 77In Equation (94) the only determinant of the price level is the level of productivity in 
the tradable industries. This special case is known as the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis of why the price level is positively correlated with income. Higher 
productivity in the tradable industries is what makes regions both rich and expensive. 
 
 
In addition to providing a theory of the price level, the world of this section is 
also useful because it allows us to study a smoother and more realistic version of the 
globalization process, i.e. a gradual reduction in the size of Nt. This is not only 
important for quantitative applications of the theory, but it also leads to new insights 
regarding the effects of globalization on welfare. The next example shows this. 
 
 





K=∅. Assume αi=0 if i∈I
H, and αi=1 if i∈I
K; and βi=0 for all i∈I. 
Within each type there are “advanced” and “backward” industries.  A-regions have 
the highest possible productivity in all industries, regardless of whether they are 
“advanced” or “backward”. B-regions have the highest possible productivity only in 
“backward” industries. Up this point all the assumptions are as in Example 2.1.2, 
except that industry factor intensities are more extreme. Assume next that initially 
some industries are nontradable, i.e. N t≠∅; and consider a small step in the 
globalization process: some “advanced” H-industries become tradable, i.e. some 
elements of the set Nt∩I
H
                                                
 move into the set Tt∩I
H. What is the effect of this partial 
reduction in transport costs on regional incomes? 
 
  The reduction of transport costs leads to structural transformation: A-regions 
reduce their production in “backward” H-industries and increase their production in 
“advanced” H-industries, while B-regions do the opposite.
69 This increases efficiency 
 
69 Given the extreme assumptions on industry factor intensities, we know that the distribution of 
production in K-industries will not be affected. 
 78and raises the combined world production of H-industries, lowering the price of their 
products and therefore wages all over the world. Therefore, a partial reduction of 
transport costs has two effects: an increase in efficiency that lowers prices and 
benefits all regions, and a change in relative prices that benefits some regions but 
hurts others. A-regions with a large enough ratio of human to physical capital are 
worse off as a result of this partial reduction in transport costs.
 70 If coupled with an 
appropriate transfer scheme, partial globalization still constitutes a Pareto 
improvement for the world economy. But now this transfer scheme might require 




The world of this sub-section is a simple and yet very useful generalization of 
the world of section 2. It allows us to study the sources of regional differences in 
price levels and also permits us to consider smoother versions of the globalization 
process. Despite this progress, the world of this sub-section fails to capture a central 
aspect of transport costs because these only affect final goods. When transport 
costs affect intermediate inputs, they create incentives to agglomerate production in 
a single location. We study how this works next. 
 
3.2 Agglomeration effects 
 
Consider a world where transport costs apply only to intermediates, and not 
to final goods. In particular, assume that the costs of transporting inputs are 
negligible if i∈Tt but prohibitive if i∈N t; while the costs of trading final goods are 
negligible for all i∈I. An implication of this last assumption is that the price level is the 
same in all regions and market-based and PPP-adjusted incomes coincide. But this 
                                                  
70 How is it possible that a region have negative gains from globalization? Since relative prices have 
changed, the region’s trade opportunities have changed also and it might no longer be possible to 
achieve the level of income and welfare that the region enjoyed before the reduction of transport costs 
in the H-industries. 
 79does not mean that we are back to the worlds of section 2. The inability of trading 
intermediate inputs creates an incentive to concentrate all the production of an 
industry in a single region. Only in this way, production of final goods can fully take 
advantage from the benefits of specialization. This force towards the agglomeration 
of economic activity has profound effects on the world income distribution and its 
dynamics. 
 
The formal description of the model is quite similar to that of section 2.3. 
Regional analogues to Equations (1)-(3) apply. Since all regions share spending 
patterns and face the same final goods prices, the price of consumption and 
investment is the same for all, and we keep Equation (4) as the numeraire rule. 
Equations (5)-(6) describing technology apply to all regions, with the corresponding 
factor prices and industry productivities. The only difference with the model of 
section 2.2 is that, even after globalization, producers of intermediate inputs in 
nontradable industries remain sheltered from foreign competition. As a result, in 
these industries Equations (9)-(10) apply to producers of intermediates in all regions 
and not only to the lowest-cost ones. Also Equation (8) applies to each region 
separately since only the demand from local producers of final goods matters for the 
producers of intermediate inputs. Thus, Equation (44) no longer applies to the 
producers of intermediate inputs in nontradable industries, and Equation (43) must 
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 80Equation (95) simply recognizes that the number of intermediate inputs available and 
their prices can vary across regions.
71 Finally, the market clearing conditions in 
Equations (11), (45) and (46) apply. 
 
This completes the formal description of the model. For any admissible set of 
capital stocks, i.e. Kc,0 for all c∈C, and sequences for the vectors of savings, human 
capital and industry productivities, i.e. Sc,t, Hc,t, and Ac,it for all c∈C and for all i∈I; and 
a sequence for the set Nt (or Tt); an equilibrium of the world economy after 
globalization consists of a sequence of prices and quantities such that the equations 
listed above hold at all dates and states of nature. Like the other worlds we have 
studied up to this point, there might be multiple geographical patterns of production 
that are consistent with world equilibrium. Unlike the worlds we have studied up to 
this point however, there might also be multiple prices and world aggregates that are 
consistent with world equilibrium. This is, in fact, the most prominent feature of this 
world. 
 
As usual, we start the analysis by defining the set of factor distributions that 
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71 Equation (95) assumes that regions always produce intermediates with the lowest indices. This 
simplifies notation a bit and carries no loss of generality. 
 81 
  When comparing this set to those in Definitions (36) and (86), we observe 
that requirement (R3) is much stronger now. While Definitions (36) and (86) only 
required that the entire production of each intermediate were located in a single 
region, Definition (96) requires that the entire production of each industry (i.e. all 
intermediates plus final goods) be located in a single region. This is a direct 
implication of the assumption that intermediate inputs are nontradable. Naturally, this 
strengthening of requirement R3 reduces the size of FPEt.
72 Therefore, this set is 
always smaller than the set in Definition (36). But it need not be smaller than the set 
in Definition (86), since requirement R4 no longer applies when final goods are 
tradable. 
 
Assume that industries are “small” and regions are “large” so that requirement 
R3 is not binding. Then, it is straightforward to see that the equilibria studied in 
section 2 still apply. If dt∈FPEt, there exists an equilibrium in which factor prices are 
equalized across regions and the world economy operates at the same level of 
efficiency as the integrated economy despite factor immobility and goods market 
segmentation. If dt
                                                
∉FPEt, the world economy cannot operate at the same level 
efficiency as the integrated economy and factor prices differ across regions. All the 
equilibria analyzed in sub-sections 2.4 and 2.5 are also equilibria for the world of this 
section, and all the results and intuitions we learned in these sub-sections remain 
valid without qualification. 
 
There is however a major difference between this world and the ones we 
studied in section 2. While the equilibria described in section 2 were unique in the 
worlds analyzed there, they are only one among many in the world of this section. 
The next example makes this point very clear: 
 
 
72 The set FPEt is never empty, but it is smaller than the set of all the factor distributions that are 
equilibria of the integrated economy. The reason is that some of these equilibria split industries across 
regions.  
 82 
Example 3.2.1: Consider a world where all industries are nontradable, i.e. 
Nt=I. Then, any collection of sets   (with  for all c c,t I ∅ ≠ c,t I ∈C) that constitutes a 
partition of I is part of an equilibrium of the world economy.
 73 This follows 
immediately from Equations (5) and (8), which now apply to each region, and 
Equation (95). Equation (5) shows that the cost of production of final good producers 
in a given region depends on the number of available inputs. But Equation (8) shows 
the number of inputs produced in a given region depends on the demand by local 
producers of final goods. 
 
This world economy exhibits a very strong form of agglomeration effects, as a 
result of backward linkages in production.
74 If there are no input producers in a 
region, the cost of producing final goods is infinity and no final goods producer will 
choose to locate in the region. But if there are no final goods producers in a region, 
there is no demand for inputs and no input producer will choose to locate in the 
region. In this world economy, these forces for agglomeration are so strong that they 
dwarf comparative advantage. It is possible that a given industry locates in a region 
offering cheap factors and high productivity, but it is also possible that it ends up 
locating in region offering expensive factors and low productivity. 
  











   for  all  c∈C 
 
                                                  
73 This world economy also has equilibria in which industries are split across regions. In these equilibria, 
all the regions that host a given industry have the same costs of producing the final goods but possibly 
different numbers and prices of inputs. 
74 Helpman and Krugman [1985] define a backward linkage as a situation in which a final good 
producer demands many inputs; and a forward linkage as a situation in which many final good 
producers demand the same input. 
 83Equation (97) is formally very similar to Equation (76). Remember that the latter 
described the world income distribution in Example 2.5.2 where differences in 
industry productivities were so strong so as to single-handedly determine 
comparative advantage. The formal similarity between these two worlds follows 
because both exhibit an extreme form of specialization. The difference, of course, is 
the underlying force that determines this specialization. While in Example 2.5.2 
regions specialize in a given industry because of their high productivity, in Example 
3.2.1 regions specialize in a given industry only because of luck. While in Example 
2.5.2 the shape and evolution of the world income distribution reflects only the 




Example 3.2.1 is extreme because it assumes all industries are nontradable. 
Assume instead that Tt≠∅, and let  . As a result of agglomeration 











t is an equilibrium of the world economy. Let again H and   be the factor 
endowments used in the production of tradable goods, i.e. all final goods and the 
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75 Given our assumption of full depreciation of inputs, nothing prevents the pattern of production to shift 
randomly from generation to generation. This model therefore is consistent with any dynamics for the 
world income distribution. If inputs depreciated slowly, initial randomness would persist for some time. 
76 Here, I am assuming that industries do not split across regions. As mentioned in an earlier footnote, 
this is possible too. 
 84Equations (98)-(99) show the factor supplies that are left after subtracting from 
aggregate factor supplies the factors used in nontradable industries. These 
Equations are analogous to Equations (87)-(88) of sub-section 3.1. One can use 
Equations (98)-(99) and a given collection of sets   to generalize the theory of 
sections 2.4 and 2.5. For instance, in Example 2.4.1 Equations (47)-(52) still apply 






t , c c,t and Kc,t. 
 
The effects of this generalization of the theory are hard to assess given the 
multiplicity of equilibria and the inherent difficulty of finding a “respectable” selection 
criteria.
77 It is always possible to find perverse equilibria in which regions specialize 
in the “wrong” industries, i.e. industries in which they do not have comparative 
advantage. Naturally, all the equilibria of section 2 in which regions specialize in the 
industries in which they have comparative advantage still apply if requirement R3 is 
not binding (as we have assumed so far). But there is no compelling reason to 
choose them over some of the alternatives. Moreover, if requirement R3 is violated 
or is binding, the equilibria studied in section 2 no longer apply to this world 
economy. The following example, inspired by Krugman and Venables [1995], relaxes 
the assumption that industries are “small” and clearly illustrates this point: 
 
 
Example 3.2.2: Consider a world with two industries I={A,M} and two regions 
C={N,S}. Assume that both industries have the same factor intensities, i.e. αi=α for 
all i∈I; but different sizes σA<0.5<σM (remember that σA+σM=1). Also assume that 
both regions are identical, i.e. they have the same savings, human capital, industry 
productivities and initial condition. Assume next that the world starts in autarky and 
globalization proceeds in two stages: in the first one industry A becomes tradable, 
i.e. Nt={M} for 0≤t<T; and in the second stage also industry M  becomes tradable, i.e. 
                                                  
77 Matsuyama [1991], Krugman [1991] and Fukao and Benabou [1993] study some interesting ways of 
resolving this indeterminacy. 
 85Nt=∅ for t≥T. In the world of autarky, both regions have the same income and the 
question that I shall address here is: How does globalization affect the world income 
distribution? 
 
  At date t=0, all transport costs disappear except for those that affect the 
intermediate inputs of industry M. There are two possible patterns of production and 
trade that can emerge as a result of this. The first one consists of both regions 
producing the same they did in autarky and not trading between them. Since both 
regions would have the same goods and factor prices, there would be no incentive 
for any producer to deviate from this equilibrium. The second possible pattern of 
production and trade that can emerge consists of each region specializing in a 
different industry. For instance, assume N specializes in industry M. The absence of 
other local producers in industry M means that producers in S have no incentive to 
produce in industry M. Since spending on industry M is more than half of world 




  It follows from this discussion that the first stage of globalization generates 
world inequality and world instability. In the world of autarky, both regions had the 
same income level and income volatility was driven by volatility in fundamentals, i.e. 
savings, human capital and industry productivities. Globalization generates 
divergence in incomes because in the equilibrium with specialization the region that 
“captures” industry M has higher income than the region that is “stuck” producing in 
industry A. The world income distribution is determined by Equation (97). One effect 
of this inequality is faster physical capital accumulation in N than in S. Globalization 
also generates instability, since the pattern of specialization can now change 
capriciously just as a result of a change in expectations. At any time the 
specialization pattern can change to the detriment of N and to the advantage of S. 
                                                  
78 The assumption that industry M is large is crucial in reducing the number of equilibria to three. If there 
were many “small” M-industries there would also be additional equilibria that split these industries 
between regions in many different ways. 
 86This constitutes an additional source of income volatility that goes beyond 
fundamentals. 
 
At date t=T, transport costs for the intermediate inputs of industry M vanish. 
Although the pattern of production and trade is not uniquely determined, we know 
that factor prices and incomes are uniquely determined.
79 Moreover, since we have 
assumed that both industries have the same factor intensities, the world income 
distribution is now given by Equation (70). It follows that the second stage of 
globalization starts a slow process of convergence in incomes that eventually 
restores equality across regions. Throughout this process, expectations no longer 




This example features a combination of agglomeration effects and “large” 
industries that underlies most of the work known as economic geography.
80 This 
research has focused on explaining how income differences can arise among 
regions that initially have the same fundamentals. The view of globalization and 
development that arises from this literature is colorful and suggestive, although it has 
not been subjected yet to serious empirical analysis. 
 
 
  Not surprisingly, globalization might lead to a Pareto-inferior outcome in the 
world of this section. The following example, which is related to Examples 2.1.2 and 
3.1.3, shows this: 
 
 
                                                  
79 When Nt=∅, we are back to the world of section 2. The reason why the pattern of production is 
indeterminate is because I have assumed that industry A and M have the same factor intensities. 
Otherwise we would be in the case of Example 2.1.1.  
80 See Fujita, Krugman and Venables [1999] and Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicaud 
[2003]. 





K=∅. Assume αi=0 if i∈I
H, and αi=1 if i∈I
K; and βi is small (but not 
zero) for all i∈I. Within each type there are “advanced” and “backward” industries.  
A-regions have the highest possible productivity in all industries, regardless of 
whether they are “advanced” or “backward”. B-regions have the highest possible 
productivity only in “backward” industries. Assume next that after globalization all 
industries are non-tradable. This world is just a special case of Example 3.2.1. We 
know therefore that there is an equilibrium in which A-regions specialize in 
“backwards” industries while B-regions specialize in “advanced” industries. This 
equilibrium can be easily shown to deliver equal or less income and welfare than 
autarky. Since βi is small for all i∈I, the benefits from an increase in market size are 
negligible. Since the allocation of production worsens relative to autarky, production 
and income go down as a result of globalization. Therefore, it is not possible to find a 
transfer scheme that ensures that globalization benefits all. 
 
 
Although this is real a theoretical possibility, it is not clear yet how seriously 
should we take the possibility that globalization worsens the world allocation of 
production and reduces welfare. How important empirically are these agglomeration 
effects? What is the relative importance of randomness and comparative advantage 
in determining the pattern of production and trade? The answers to these questions 
are critical in determining whether the basic policy prescription that simply opening 
up to trade leads to development really applies or not. In the worlds of this section, 
opening up to trade can lead to miracles and disasters alike. A miracle is nothing but 
a lucky region that attracts a large number of industries exhibiting agglomeration 
effects. A disaster is an unlucky region that cannot do so. Opening up to trade is 
therefore a gamble. It opens the door for industries to come into the region and 
enrich it, but it also opens the door for industries to leave the region and impoverish 
it. Naturally, the temptation to change the odds of this gamble using industrial 
policies and protectionism might be overwhelming. The prescriptions for 
 88development are therefore easy to spot but not pleasant. This is a world 
characterized by negative international spillovers and strong temptations to use 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. 
 
Despite the presence of transport costs, differences in regional market size 
still play no role in determining the world income distribution in the worlds of this sub-
section and the previous one. If intermediate inputs are tradable, all regions use the 
same set of specialized inputs and enjoy the same level of industry specialization or 
technology to produce final goods. If final goods are tradable, industries concentrate 
their production in one or few regions and all regions buy their final goods at the 
same prices. The ability to trade intermediates and/or final goods therefore implies 
that regional differences in market size cannot be a source of regional differences in 
incomes. We next turn to a world that features some industries in which neither 
intermediates nor final goods can be traded. This brings back market size effects as 
a determinant of the world income distribution. 
 
3.3 The role of local markets 
 
We turn next to a world in which the costs of trading intermediate inputs and 
final goods are prohibitive if i∈Nt, but negligible if i∈Tt. As in all the worlds considered 
in this chapter, the benefits of developing specialized inputs depend on the size of 
the industry’s market. For tradable industries, this market is the world economy. For 
nontradable industries, this market is the region. As a result, regional differences in 
market size will be translated into regional differences in the degree of specialization 
or technology of nontradable industries.
 81 
                                                  
81 There is little empirical evidence that regional differences in market size are an important determinant 
of income differences. When one interprets the data from the vantage point of the world of autarky, this 
observation implies that market size effects are weak and sustained growth is not possible. This has led 
many researchers to spend a substantial effort in developing autarky models where sustained growth is 
possible without market size effects. Somewhat ironically, once one takes a world equilibrium view of 
the growth process what requires a substantial effort is to develop models where regional differences in 
market size do affect the world income distribution. 
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Formally, this model is very similar to the one in sub-section 3.1. Equations 
(81)-(82) describe investment and consumption, while Equations (83)-(84) still 
provide the numeraire rule and the price level. Naturally, Equation (3) describing 
spending patterns still applies to all regions, and Equations (5)-(6) describing 
technology apply to all regions, with the corresponding factor prices and industry 
productivities. The only difference with the model of section 3.1 is when Equations 
Equations (7)-(10) describing pricing policies, input demands and the free-entry 
condition apply. For tradable industries, these Equations apply only to those regions 
where the lowest-cost producers are located. For nontradable industries, these 
Equations apply to all regions and not only to the lowest-cost ones. Thus, Equation 
(44) no longer applies to producers in nontradable industries, and Equation (93) 
must be replaced by Equation (95). Market clearing conditions are also the same as 
in the model of section 3.1, and consist of Equations (45)-(46) describing market 
clearing in regional factor markets, Equation (11) describing market clearing in global 
markets for tradable industries, and Equation (85) describing market clearing in 
regional markets for nontradable industries. 
 
This completes the formal description of the model. For any admissible set of 
capital stocks, i.e. Kc,0 for all c∈C; sequences for the vectors of savings, human 
capital and industry productivities, i.e. Sc,t, Hc,t, and Ac,it for all c∈C and for all i∈I; and 
a sequence for the set Nt (or Tt); an equilibrium of the world economy after 
globalization consists of a sequence of prices and quantities such that the equations 
listed above hold in all dates and states of nature. Like other worlds we have studied 
up to now, there might be multiple geographical patterns of production that are 
consistent with world equilibrium. But unlike the world of the previous sub-section 
(and like the worlds of section 2 and sub-section 3.1), prices and world aggregates 
are uniquely determined. 
 
 90In this world economy, the set FPEt is empty. Since intermediate inputs that 
are produced in a region cannot be used in another region, the world economy 
cannot reach the level of efficiency of the integrated economy.
82 Despite this, it is 
relatively straightforward to analyze this world. Define again  and K  as the 
factor endowments devoted to the production of tradable goods, i.e. all intermediate 
inputs and final goods of tradable industries. Straightforward algebra shows that: 
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Since factor supplies are well behaved, all the results in sections 2.4 and 2.5 
regarding market-based incomes and factor prices still go through in the presence of 
nontradable industries. As in sub-section 3.1, the only important difference between 
the world of this sub-section and the one in section 2 is that there is a discrepancy 
between market-based and real incomes and factor prices. In particular, we can 
write the price level of region c as follows: 
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P  for all c∈C 
 
                                                  
82 The set FPEt might be non-empty in the limiting case where βi→0 (or εi→∞) for all i∈I. But that limiting 
case brings us to the world of sub-section 3.1. 
83 To see this, note that the shares of human and physical capital devoted to producing the final good of 
the i
th nontradable industry are now (1-αi) and αi. Add over industries and note that the share of 
spending in the i
th industry is σi⋅Yc,t. 
 91The only difference between this Equation and Equation (91) is that the 
number and price of intermediate inputs varies across regions. Using Equations (6) 
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Basically, this model brings another element to the theory of the price level. 
To the extent that nontradable industries exhibit increasing returns, regions with 
larger markets have lower price levels and higher real incomes. 
 
It is straightforward to re-do some of the previous examples in the context of 
this world. But I shall not do this. The picture that this world generates is clear and 
unappealing form an empirical standpoint: regional differences in market size are 
reflected in regional differences in price levels. Ceteris paribus, larger local markets 
do not lead to higher market-based incomes and factor prices. But they do lead to 




4. Final remarks 
 
  This chapter has developed a unified and yet tractable framework that 
integrates many key insights of the fields of international trade and economic growth. 
Its distinguishing feature is that it provides a global view of the growth process, that 
is, a view that treats different regions of the world as parts of a single whole. This 
framework incorporates the standard idea that economic growth in the world 
economy is determined by a tension between diminishing returns and market size 
effects to capital accumulation. A substantial effort has been made to show how 
 92trade frictions of various sorts determine the shape of the world income distribution 
and its dynamics. 
 
  Despite the length of this chapter, some important topics have been left out. 
The first and most glaring omission is asset trade. This type of trade allows the world 
economy to redirect its investment towards regions that offer the highest risk-
adjusted return.
84 To the extent that patterns of trade are determined by comparative 
advantage, these are the regions where capital is scarce and productive and this 
raises efficiency in the world economy. To the extent that patterns of trade are 
determined by luck, asset trade magnifies the effect of this randomness and this 
could either raise or lower the efficiency of the world economy. If this were all there 
is to asset trade, it would not be too difficult to add to this chapter a section on asset 
trade in which we endow the world economy with a complete set of asset markets. 
But asset trade does not seem to work as the standard theory of complete markets 
would suggest. Empirically asset trade seems both much smaller and much more 
volatile than it would be warranted by its fundamentals, i.e. savings, human capital 
and industry productivities. To understand these aspects of asset trade it seems 
necessary to incorporate to the theory features such as sovereign risk, asymmetric 
information and asset bubbles. Although this is a very important task, it would 




  A second important omission of this chapter is government policy. A central 
aspect of globalization so far has been its imbalanced nature. While economic 
integration has proceeded at a relatively fast pace, political integration is advancing 
at a slower pace or not advancing at all. The world economy today features global 
(or semi-global) markets but local governments. In this context, globalization can 
lead to a decline in growth and income through a reduction in the quality of policies. 
                                                  
84 Naturally, asset trade also allows for a better risk sharing and this raises welfare. Better risk sharing 
might also increase investment and growth. See Obstfeld [1994]. 
85 Among the many papers that study the behavior of financial markets in world equilibrium models, see 
Gertler and Rogoff [1990], Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1997], Ventura [2002], Matsuyama [2004], Martin and 
Rey [2002, 2004], Kraay, Loayza, Servén and Ventura [2005] and Broner and Ventura [2005]. 
 93International spillovers eliminate the incentives to adopt good but costly policies. 
Trade also “bails out” regions with bad policies since they can spare some of their 
costs by specializing in industries where bad policies have little effects. As a result of 
these forces, globalization could create a “race to the bottom” in policies that lowers 
savings, human capital, and industry productivities. And this could potentially 
mitigate or even reverse the benefits from economic integration.
86 Understanding the 
circumstances under which this “race to the bottom” can happen and the appropriate 
policy corrections that are required to allow the world economy to take full advantage 
of globalization is another important task. But this task would also require another 
chapter of this magnitude and cannot be undertaken here. 
 
  At first sight, factor movements might seem a third important omission. But I 
think it is less so. As mentioned in section 2, the notion that physical and human 
capital is geographically immobile seems a fair description of reality. Moreover, the 
benefits of factor mobility might be reaped without factors having to move at all.  
What is really important about factor movements is that they permit factors located in 
different regions to work together and produce. Advances in telecommunications 
technology and the standardization of software allow producers around the world to 
combine physical and human capital located in different regions in a single 
production process. We can always think of this situation as one in which the 
production process has been broken down into intermediate inputs. An increased 
ability to combine factors located in different regions could therefore be modeled as 
an increase in the tradability of intermediate inputs, or as an increase in the share of 
intermediate inputs, or as the development of additional inputs with more extreme 
factor intensities. All of these possibilities could be (and some have already been) 
analyzed within the framework developed in this chapter.
87 
                                                  
86 See Levchenko [2004] for a situation in which globalization leads to a “race to the top” in government 
policies, though. 
87 An increase in the tradability of inputs corresponds to a gradual increase in Tt in the models of section 
3.2 and 3.3. An increase in the share of intermediate inputs corresponds to a gradual increase in βi, 
while the development of inputs with more extreme factor intensities corresponds to a gradual change 
in αi. I have assumed throughout that industry characteristics are time-invariant only for simplicity. All 
the formulas in this chapter remain valid if we instead assume that industry characteristics vary, 
perhaps stochastically, over time. 
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  The goal of this chapter has been to convey a global way of thinking about 
the growth process. To claim success, you should be persuaded by now that 
developing and systematically studying world equilibrium models is a necessary 
condition to gain a true understanding of the growth process. By “true”, I mean the 
sort of understanding that allows us to frame clear and unambiguous hypotheses 
about why some countries are richer than others or what are the main forces that 
drive economic growth in the world economy. To claim success, you should also be 
convinced by now that much is already known about the structure of world 
equilibrium models. But you should also be aware that the global view of economic 
growth that these models reveal is still somewhat fuzzy and blurred. Sharpening this 
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Notes: This figure shows the dynamics of world per capita GDP for the 
selected years 1500, 1820, 1870, 1913, 1950, 1973, and 1998 (in log of 
1990 US$). Data are from Angus Maddison, “The World Economy – A 
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Notes: This figure shows average annual growth rates by major world regions for selected 
periods. Data are derived from Angus Maddison, “The World Economy – A Millennial 
Perspective” Table 3-1b page126. (Western Europe contains Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Portugal, 
Spain, Greece and 13 small countries; Western Offshoots are United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand; Asia is China, India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Indochina, Iran, Turkey and 
Other East and West Asian countries; Latin America includes Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Others; 
Eastern Europe contains Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and territories of former 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; Africa is Egypt and Others.) 





















Notes: The figure shows Volume of World Exports over World GDP (in 
constant US$) for selected dates. Data are from Tables 3-1b, A1-b, A2-
b, A3-b, A4-b, pages126, 184, 194, 214, and 223 in Angus Maddison, 
“The World Economy – A Millennial Perspective”. 
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slope:           0.3   (3.84) 
constant:      0.04 (1.18) 
R sq. adj.:     0.41     
 
Notes: This figure plots annualized rate of trade growth against annualized rate of 
per capita GDP growth for major world regions and selected periods. The Regions 
are Western Europe, Western Offshoots, Eastern Europe and former USSR, Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa. Periods are 1870-1913, 1913-1950, 1950-1973 and 
1973-1998. Each data point stands for one region during one period. The solid line 
represents the prediction of a linear regression. The estimated regression are 
reported in the box, t-statistics are in brackets. Data are from Angus Maddison, 
“The World Economy – A Millennial Perspective”. Data for GDP growth are 
obtained from Table 3-1b page126 and Table B-10  page 241 (to include Japan). 
Data for export growth are derived from Table F-3 page362 and Tables A1-b, A2-b, 
A3-b, and A4-b, pages 184, 194, 214 and 223, respectively.  
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The “deterministic” case  
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Notes: This figure shows the case of strong deminishing returns and weak market 
size effects. In the top panel, the stock of physical capital converges 
monotonically to its unique steady state. The bottom panel shows the stochastic 
case, where the stock of physical capital converges to the steady state interval 
[ ] K K,  within which it fluctuates according to the states of the world. 
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αµ + υ > 1  
 
The “deterministic” case  
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Notes: This figure shows the case of weak diminishing returns and strong market 
size effects. In the top panel, the stock of physical capital grows at increasing 
rates since Ko > K. In the bottom panel the stock of physical capital fluctuates 
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Effects of Economic Integration 
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Notes: This figure illustrates the effects of economic integration. The top panel 
shows that, if α⋅µ+υ<1, economic integration has level effects on income. The 
bottom panel shows that, if α⋅µ+υ>1, economic integration has growth effects on 
incomes. 
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Notes: The box in this figure is a geometrical representation of the set  , as each element of 
this set is a point in the box and vice versa. For instance,   is a factor distribution such that A-
regions have more human and physical capital than B-regions; but human capital is relatively 
more abundant in A-regions than in B-regions. The box also contains a set of vectors that 
represent the factor usage per industry that would apply in the integrated economy. For 
instance, the vector V
t D
* d
it has height Hit and width Kit. The set   is the gray area. Since all 
regions have the same industry productivities, production trivially takes place only in regions 
with the highest possible productivity (requirement R1). Each of the points in the gray area can 
be generated as a convex combination of the integrated economy’s vectors of factor usage per 
industry (requirement R2). Since β
t FPE
i=0, trivially there are no fixed costs of production that are 
incurred twice (requirement R3). Points outside of the shaded area do not have this property 
and therefore do not belong to  .   t FPE
The factor content of production is given by the regions’ factor endowments, i.e.  . Since all 
regions have the same spending shares and use the same techniques to produce all goods, the 
factor content of consumption lies in the diagonal, i.e. c .  
* d
*
In A-regions, the H-industry is a net exporter while the K-industry is a net importer. The opposite 
occurs in B-regions. 
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Notes: The box in this Figure is a geometrical representation of the set  , as each element of 
this set is a point in the box and vice versa. For instance,   is a factor distribution such that A-
regions have more human and physical capital than B-regions; but human capital is relatively 
more abundant in A-regions than in B-regions. There are four different industries, “advanced” 
physical (human) capital intensive and “backward” physical (human) capital intensive. The A-
countries have a highest productivity in the “advanced” industries; technologies in the 
“backward” industries are equal in all countries. The vectors V  have height   and width 
 and represent the factor content of the X-industries, where X=A,B stands for “advanced” or 
“backward” industries. The set   is the shaded area. In this set, all “advanced” industries 
must be located in the A-countries (requirement R1). Once this requirement is satisfied, each of 
the points in the shaded area can be generated as a convex combination of the integrated 











trivially there are no fixed costs of production that are incurred twice (requirement R3). Points 
outside of the shaded area do not have both properties and therefore do not belong to  .   t FPE
The factor content of production is given by the regions’ factor endowments, i.e.  . Since all 
regions have the same spending shares and use the same techniques to produce all goods, the 
factor content of consumption lies in the diagonal, i.e.  . In H-regions, the H-industry is a net 
exporter while the K-industry is a net importer. The opposite occurs in K-regions. 
* d
* c
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Notes: This figure shows how the wage-rental ratio varies with the factor 
proportions. The top panel represents a two-goods, one-cone world where 
countries with extreme factor proportions are outside the cone (Example 
2.4.1). The middle panel represents a three-good, two-cone world where 
countries with intermediate factor proportions lie outside the cone (Example 
2.4.2). The bottom panel shows a world with multiple goods and cones. 
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Notes: This figure shows how pattern of production and trade (i*) and relative 
factor costs (fN,t/fS,t) are determined in Example 2.5.3. The top panel shows 
the case of arbitrarily small differences in industry productivities. The middle 
panel shows the case of arbitrarily large differences in industry productivities. 
The bottom panel shows the intermediate case. 
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